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In 2006, the People’s Republic of China adopted an innovation policy designed to 
accelerate domestic economic innovation. With this policy, China aimed to shift its 
economy from one that manufactures products at the lower end of the value-added chain 
to one manufacturing products at the top of the value-added chain. China plans to become 
not only a high-technology manufacturing nation but to become the world-leader in 
innovation. Certain aspects of this plan for endogenous growth through state-driven 
economic innovation were economically competitive with the United States. This thesis 
will assess the impact of the PRC’s plans and actions to drive innovation, to include 
answering the following questions: Have the PRC’s actions regarding innovation made 
an impact on its economic performance? And consequently: How might we expect 
China’s state-driven-innovation to affect U.S.–China relations? This thesis will show that 
China’s “Indigenous Innovation” policy has made some minor contributions to raising 
the levels of innovation in China but will likely fall short of the 2006–2020 MLP goals. 
Furthermore, although this policy initially included economically competitive elements, it 
has been adjusted and in its present form is less likely to have a negative impact on future 
U.S.-China Relations.  
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A. WHY CHINA’S ABILITY TO INNOVATE MATTERS TO THEM AND 
TO THE REST OF THE WORLD  
The history of modernization is in essence a history of scientific and 
technological progress. Scientific discovery and technological inventions 
have brought about new civilizations, modern industries, and the rise and 
fall of nations … I firmly believe that science is the ultimate revolution. 
—Wen Jiabao, Premier, People’s Republic of China 1  
In 2006, the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) adopted a 
policy known as “Indigenous Innovation” (or in Chinese, zizhu chuangxin) that was 
designed to drive domestic economic innovation. The basic tenets of the plan call for: 
 Chinese society to develop a culture of innovation; government programs 
to support basic research 
 The creation of an advanced scientific and technical education system; the 
development of strong intellectual property protection 
 The fostering of entrepreneurship 
These requirements can be considered the foundations of an innovative society.2 
Certain aspects of this policy worry Western economists especially during current 
sluggish economic times. This thesis will assess the impact of the PRC’s plans and 
actions to drive innovation, to include answering the following questions: Have the 
PRC’s actions regarding innovation made an impact on its economic performance? And, 
consequently: How might China’s state-led efforts to promote innovation affect U.S.–
China relations? 
                                                 
1Norman R. Augustine, C. Barrett, G. Cassell, N. Grasmick, C. Holliday, and S. A. Jackson, “Rising 
Above the Gathering Storm, Revisited: Rapidly Approaching Category 5” (Washington, DC: National 
Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine, 2010), 72. 
2 USCC, Assessing China’s Efforts to Become an “Innovation Society” – A Progress Report, Hearing 
Before The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. 112 Cong. 2. (2012) (Statement of 
Robert D. Atkinson, President, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation). 393. 
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1. Findings and Argument 
With the outcome of “Indigenous Innovation” potentially affecting not only China 
but also the rest of the world, it is very important to fully understand the details and 
nature of this policy. Eight years have passed since the implementation of “Indigenous 
Innovation,” in China’s Medium and Long-Term Plan (MLP) from 2006–2020, long 
enough to make some preliminary assessments of its effectiveness and impacts. This 
thesis suggests that there are three potential effects of “Indigenous Innovation” on 
China’s economic performance. The first possibility, Indigenous Innovation Flops, 
asserts that “Indigenous Innovation” has not been an effective policy thus far, has not 
brought the desired economic growth, and has needlessly disrupted international trade, 
investments, and commerce by what has been deemed by some as “techno-national” 
policies. The second possibility, Indigenous Innovation becomes China’s new economic 
engine, finds that “Indigenous Innovation” is on track to succeed, according to output 
indicators, possibly replacing the old economy dominated by foreign direct investment 
and low-tech manufacturing. The third possibility, Indigenous Innovation is Irrelevant for 
Chinese Growth, shows that “Indigenous Innovation” policies have had a negligible 
impact on China’s continued economic development and level of innovation. The 
changes that have allowed for continued growth of China were already happening and 
would have continued to happen without this policy. 
Based on current data and analysis, the most significant finding of this thesis is 
that so far China’s Indigenous Innovation Flops. Even though this policy has made some 
minor contributions to raising the levels of innovation and economic growth in China but 
will likely fall short of the lofty goals of the 2006–2020 MLP. “Indigenous Innovation” is 
not yet the new economic engine China hoped it would be, but it is a broad strategic 
approach that will have long lasting effects in the future. Innovation is driving growth in 
China, however as shown by the details of patent filing statistics, it is mostly market 
driven incremental and manufacturing innovation and not the invention or new product 
innovation that China is seeking. China is likely to reach its innovation benchmarks but 
not until 10 years after its initial target dates. If China can adjust its policy to focus more 
on the university-private enterprise R&D nexus and ease societal/cultural pressures to be 
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risk averse and failure avoidant, then it could possibly turn its modernization in the right 
direction coming closer to achieving its goals for innovation. It is likely only a matter of 
time before China has its own “Google” or “Apple” like global-tech-giants with regular 
breakthrough innovations contributing to endogenous growth. 
2. Importance 
a. China’s Rapid Economic Rise and the Need for Sustainable Economic 
Growth 
From the 1980s onward China has grown faster than any other economy in the 
world. According to official figures, from 1978 to 2005 China’s economy, in terms of 
GDP, grew at an annual average of 10.0%.3 This growth, for the most part, was built on 
an increasingly efficient deployment of the country’s enormous human and physical 
capital in the manufacturing sector. By 2006, without the benefits of “Indigenous 
Innovation,” China was already on a trajectory of unprecedented growth. This massive 
growth, beyond bringing wealth to a few, had the profound effect of lifting hundreds of 
millions out of poverty. The estimated poverty rate for China in 1980 was 75.7%. 
Through the rapid growth from 1980 until 2001 poverty was reduced to 12.5%.4 The 
percentages stand out even more when one considers the sheer size of the Chinese 
population now at 1.3 billion people.  
Although China’s rapid growth has brought much good, the PRC has had  
to evaluate both where this growth has come from, and how to continue growth into  
the future. By the turn of the century China had become a manufacturing  
powerhouse, producing a rapidly growing share of the worlds manufactured goods. By 
2011 China surpassed the United States as the world’s largest manufacturer of goods.5 As 
Chinese government officials evaluated the status of their nation’s economic growth  
they recognized the need for change. They realized that in order to obtain sustained  
                                                 
3 Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2007), 3. 
4 Loren Brandt and Thomas G. Rawski, “China’s Great Economic Transformation,” China Business 
Review 35, no. 6 (November 2008), 32. 
5 Peter Marsh, “China Noses Ahead as Top Goods Producer,” Financial Times 13 (2011), 1. 
4growth, they needed to improve their Science and Technology (S&T), and innovation 
capabilities.6  
Without continued growth China may not be able to employ large portions of its 
massive population, which could lead to instability and political unrest. Both the Chinese 
government and economists alike assess that the current pattern or model of growth is 
unsustainable. Rapid industrialization and urbanization have impacted China with several 
major issues including: massive consumption of energy and raw materials, degradation of 
the environment, regional disparity in growth and wealth distribution, mass migration 
from rural to urban areas. Couple these issues with rising wages, an aging workforce, and 
higher demands for social services and the outlook, if unchanged, is rather bleak. The 
staggering size of China’s population brings a unique set of issues to the government of 
China, multiplying the effects of their growth issues.7 
Much of China’s recent growth has been through technological diffusion, foreign 
direct investment and domestic investments. This growth model has been characterized 
by Jeffery Sachs as Catching-up growth.8 This catching up growth made China a global 
leader in low-tech manufacturing. According to Bottelier and Foster of the Norwegian 
School of Management, the recent growth in China was not fueled by low wages but 
instead by high productivity growth primarily in the manufacturing sector.9 Growth on 
the basis of physical and human capital runs into the law of diminishing marginal returns. 
Neo-Classical economic theory has established as axiomatic that only growth based on 
innovation—measured as total factor productivity—can allow a country, once it has 
“caught up,” to sustain high growth rates over a long period of time. 
6 “White Paper on China’s peaceful Development,” Accessed on January 20 2013, http: 
//www.gov.cn/english/official/20 ll-09/06/content_ l941354_2.htm. 
7 OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy China, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2008. 
8 Jeffrey D. Sachs, “Globalization and Patterns of Economic Development,” Weltwirtschaftliches 
Archiv, Bd. 136, H. 4 (2000), 581. Accessed January 13, 2013, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40440807. 
9 Pieter Bottelier, Gail Foster, and Conference Board, Can China’s Growth Trajectory Be Sustained? 
(New York: The Conference Board, Inc, 2007), 6. 
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b. Significance of Innovation  
Throughout the world governments and scholars emphasize innovation as the key 
to global prosperity.10 In his 2011 State of the Union Address, U.S. President, Barack 
Obama used the word “innovation” nine times and the need to renew American sources 
of innovation was a central theme of his speech.11 European Commission President José 
Manuel Durão Barroso said the following regarding the importance of innovation: 
“History shows - from the Renaissance to the industrial revolution and to the current ICT 
evolution that there is no sustainable path to growth and prosperity outside the research-
innovation-education triangle.”12 China’s leaders since reforms were initiated have also 
focused on the advancement of S&T and innovation. They firmly believe, like President 
Obama, in the inherent and essential link between innovation and economic growth as 
explained by Pack and Westphal.13 A general explanation of the relation of innovation to 
economic growth draws from the Endogenous Growth Theory.14 This theory asserts that 
growth is a product of human capital, physical capital, and Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP). TFP is a measure of technology, innovation, and labor productivity. Therefore, as 
a nation increases innovation its economy grows. Most recently China’s new president Xi 
Jinping was quoted by Xinhua saying that “Implementing a strategy of innovation-driven 
development will be fundamental in accelerating the transformation of China’s growth 
pattern, solving deep-rooted problems concerning economic development and enhancing 
economic vitality.”15 The Economist claimed in a 2010 article that: “...Emerging 
countries are no longer content to be sources of cheap hands and low-cost brains. Instead, 
                                                 
10 “2011 State of Innovation Report Featuring DWPI” (New York: Thompson Reuters, 2011), 3. 
11 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in State of Union Address,” Office of the Press 
Secretary, The White House, (25 JAN 2011), accessed February 13, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-union-address. 
12José Manuel Durão Barroso, The Innovation Union One Year on Innovation Convention 2011, 
SPEECH/11/847, (Brussels: 5 December 2011), 2. 
13 Howard Pack and L. E. Westphal, “Industrial Strategy and Technological Change: Theory Versus 
Reality,” Journal of Development Economics, 22, no. 1 (1986): 87–128. 
14Paul Romer, “Endogenous Technological Change,” Journal of Political Economy 98, no. 5 (1990): 
71–102. 
15 “Xi Urges Innovation-Driven Growth,” Xinhua, March 4, 2013, Accessed March 14, 2013, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013–03/04/c_132207617.htm. 
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they too are becoming hotbeds of innovation, producing breakthroughs in everything 
from telecoms to car making to health care. …Developing countries are competing on 
creativity as well as cost.”16 
As innovation has taken the spotlight for economic development so has 
international competition associated by some with innovation. There is a significant 
amount of concern both among U.S. citizens and government leaders regarding the 
relationship of the United States with China. If China’s economic growth and policies 
directed toward growth continue along the present course the probability of increased 
tensions and strained international relations are likely.17 Chief among the Chinese 
policies that could potentially stifle the United States economically is China’s proclaimed 
“Indigenous Innovation” campaign. This campaign, embarked on in 2006, consists of 
both top-down state driven policies mandating innovation and efforts to encourage 
bottom-up incentive-fostered innovation. Some of these policies potentially hamper free 
trade and reduce competitiveness of U.S. corporations—issues that top agendas at almost 
every bilateral meeting between the two nations.18 
c. China’s “Indigenous Innovation” Policy 
China has in the last seven years embarked on a major drive to shift its economy 
from one that manufactures products at the lower end of the value-added chain to one that 
is inventing, developing and manufacturing cutting edge technology products at the top 
end of the value-added chain. The policies adopted by the government to increase 
innovation are split between top-down mandated innovation and bottom-up self-driven 
innovation. China wants to incrementally move up the chain toward becoming not only a 
high-technology manufacturing nation but to become the world leader in high technology 
and innovation. Although the drive for innovation had manifested years earlier it 
                                                 
16 “Innovation: The New Masters of Management,” The Economist, April 17th, 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/15908408. 
17 Jonathan Kirshner, “The Consequences of China’s Economic Rise for Sino-U.S. Relations,” in 
China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics, eds. Robert S. Ross, and Feng 
Zhu (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2008), 239–240.   
18 Micah Springut, Stephen Schlaikjer, and David Chen, China’s Program for Science and 
Technology Modernization: Implications for American Competitiveness, Prepared for The U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission (Arlington; VA: CENTRA Technology, Inc., 2011), 130. 
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solidified in 2006 as outlined in the 15-year Medium and Long-Term Plan (MLP) to 
2020. 
The plan for innovation in the MLP was referred to as the campaign for 
“Indigenous Innovation” and included a list of 402 technologies (in many of these the 
United States is currently the market leader) that China was seeking to develop as areas 
of expertise. The plan called for China to become an “innovation-oriented society” by 
2020 and to become a world leader in science and technology (S&T) by 2050. The MLP 
also set benchmarks for 2020 that included: increasing gross domestic expenditures on 
research and development (GERD) from 1.34% (2005) to 2.5%, increase economic 
growth fueled by technological advance to 60%, and limit its dependence on foreign 
technology to 30%.19 
Since its announcement of the “Indigenous Innovation” plan, China reiterated its 
focus on innovation with the announcement of the 12th Five-Year Plan in March of 2011, 
that called for seven high tech industries to boost their percentage of gross domestic 
product (GDP) from the current 5% to 15% by 2020.20 According to the U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission 2011 report, China plans to increase its 
GERD from 1.75% of GDP (in 2010) to 2.2% of GDP by 2015.21 In comparison, the 
United States government and private sectors combined to spend 2.8% of GDP on GERD 
in 2011.22 
The United States is also seeking to drive economic growth through innovation. It 
is the view of many that because markets are competitive; this will undoubtedly lead to 
                                                 
19 Cong Cao, Richard P. Suttmeier, and Denis Fred Simon, “China’s 15-year Science and Technology 
Plan,” Physics Today (December 2006), 38. 
20 Thomas Stanley, and Vivian Xu, “China’s 12th Five Year Plan: Overview,” KPMG China, (March 
2011), http://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Publicationseries/5-years-
plan/Documents/China-12th-Five-Year-Plan-Overview-201104.pdf. 
21 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2011 Report to Congress (112th Cong. 2, 
November, 2011), 90.  
22 “R & D Spending Growth Continues while Globalization Accelerates,” R&D Magazine 53, no. 7 
(2011): 35. 
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friction between the United States and China.23 Despite the competitive nature of markets 
that does not necessarily mean that growth or innovation is zero-sum. As history has 
proven many nations can share the top economic positions; while sometimes competing, 
each can specialize in different sectors. U.S. government spending on R&D has dropped 
since 2009 in conjunction with the global economic recession. An increase in private 
spending on R&D in the United States has kept year to year spending from an aggregate 
decline. The Obama administration has made declarations regarding innovation that are 
quite similar to their Chinese counterparts. With the economic setbacks of the recession, 
the administration has been hampered in its effort to spark U.S. innovation through 
spending on R&D. At an address before the National Academy of Sciences in 2009, 
President Obama announced his plan to increase GERD from 2.7% to 3.0% in terms of 
GDP (see Table 1).  




PPP Bil. $ 
2010 R&D 












PPP Bil, $ 
2012 R&D 




1 United States 14,660 2.83% 415.1 15,203 2.81% 427.2 15,305 2.85% 436.0 
2 China 10,090 1.48% 149.3 11,283 1.55% 174.9 12,434 1.60% 198.9 
3 Japan 4,310 3.44% 148.3 4,382 3.47% 152.1 4,530 3.48% 157.6 
4 Germany 2,940 2.82% 82.9 3,085 2.85% 87.9 3,158 2.87% 90.6 
Source: Data adapted from; Battelle, R&D Magazine, 2011.24 
                                                 
23 United States International Trade Commission, China: Effects of Intellectual Property Infringement 
and Indigenous Innovation Policies on the U.S. Economy USITC, Investigation No. 332–519, Publication 
4226 (2011), xiii. 
24 “R & D Spending Growth Continues,” R&D Magazine (2011): 36. 
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Although U.S. government spending on R&D has fallen short of goals due to the 
economic recession, the administration has continued its charge for growth through 
innovation seeded by R&D spending. In his 2011 State of the Union address, President 
Obama proclaimed, “Maintaining our leadership in research and technology is crucial to 
America’s success.” He called for actions to double “the budgets of three key science 
bureaus: the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes for Standards and 
Technology, and the Department of Energy’s Office of Science.”25 If the global 
percentages of investment toward innovation shifts between the United States and China 
will this lead to a shift of global economic leadership from the United States to China? 
This is a similar question that was asked regarding the United States and Japan in the 
1980s. Japan’s economic rise is a good historical example of how economic success and 
growth of other nations, although sometimes competitive, does not foretell economic 
disaster for the United States. 
3. Literature Review 
Literature on the effectiveness of innovation policies in China and its subsequent 
effects on U.S.–China relations, provide numerous conclusions and hypotheses. This 
thesis will evaluate these views based on the evidence provided and determine which is 
most persuasive. The extant literature relating to “Indigenous Innovation” its 
effectiveness and resulting impacts on U.S.-China relations breaks down into the 
following schools of thought:  
Effectiveness of “Indigenous Innovation” 
 Superpower on the way–China’s “Indigenous Innovation” policies have it 
on track to become an “Innovative Society” boosting its economic growth. 
(e.g., R&D Magazine 2013, Thompson Reuters, Steve Lohr) 
 Not anytime soon–China will not become an innovative society according 
to its goals laid out in the campaign for “Indigenous Innovation” retarding 
China’s future economic growth. (e.g., Joseph Sternberg, Anil K. Gupta, 
Wang Haiyan, Ross Terrill, Geoff Dyer, Richard Waters, Yuqing Xing) 
                                                 
25 “U.S. Scientific Research and Development 101: Understanding Why These Investments Are Key 
to Our Future Economic Competitiveness,” Science Progress (online magazine), (February 16, 2011), 1, 
accessed 01 September 2012, http://scienceprogress.org/2011/02/u-s-scientific-research-and-development-
101/. 
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Impact of “Indigenous Innovation” on U.S.–China relations 
 The U.S. is in peril of falling behind–The United States is in peril from 
China’s mercantilist policies. (e.g., Robert D. Atkinson, Clyde Prestowitz, 
Thomas M. Hout, Pankaj Ghemawat, Adam Segal, USCC) 
 
 The United States maintains dominance–The United States is still the best, 
and will continue to be the best. There is no need for the west to worry 
about “Indigenous Innovation.” (e.g., Edward Steinfeld, C. Fred Bergsten, 
Bates Gill, Nicholas R. Lardy, Derek Mitchell, OECD reports on China 
innovation, Tai Ming Cheung, Anil K. Gupta, Wang Haiyan) 
 
 China is catching up but the U.S. is still in the lead–The U.S. share of 
global innovation has dwindled but the game has changed and the U.S. can 
continue to lead if it proceeds with caution. (e.g., Dan Bresnitz, Michal 
Murphree, National Academy of Sciences, Dennis Fred Simon, Cong Cao, 
Henry S. Rowen, Barry Naughton) 
a. Superpower on the Way 
According to the believers in “Indigenous Innovation” China’s campaign for 
innovation is leading it to become a world superpower within the next 20 years. Battelle 
R&D experts claim that China will surpass the U.S. economy by 2015 and become the 
world’s top funder of R&D before 2020. They use the following statistics to show the 
trend based on China’s focused effort to modernize through innovation. In 2012, China 
increased spending on R&D by 11.3% and in 2013 it is expected to increase R&D 
spending by an additional 11.6%. In 2011, China’s spending on R&D was 43% of the 
amount spent by the United States. In 2013, China is expected to spend 52% of what the 
United States spends on R&D.26 Bob Stembridge and Eve Y. Zhou, with Thompson 
Reuters, cite patent filing statistics and other data to show that “Indigenous Innovation” is 
working and that China is on its way to becoming the world economic hegemon. They 
claim that “Never before in history has such a concentrated culture of innovation grown 
so quickly and with such unity of purpose.”27 
                                                 
26 2013 Global R&D Funding Forecast (Rockaway, NJ: Advantage Business Media, R&D Magazine, 
Battelle, December 2012), 29. 
27 Bob Stembridge and Eve Y. Zhou, Patented in China, the Present and Future State of Innovation in 
China, New York: Thompson Reuters (2010), 24. 
 11
Believers in “Indigenous Innovation” also cite statistics of China’s growing 
numbers of engineering graduates, published research papers, and “high-tech” exports 
(see Table 2). These numbers at first glance seem staggering however this is often a case 
of quantity over quality and most of the “high-tech” exports either originate outside of 
China or are manufactured under patents held by foreign corporations. 
Table 2.   Status of China’s R&D Spending and Publication of Research Papers 
2013 GDP, billion $, PPP 13,344









Basic Research Share 5%
Applied Research Share 13%
Development Research Share 82%
Source: Battelle/R&D Magazine, 2013.28 
b. Not Anytime Soon  
Many experts are skeptical that China will meet its goals for innovation. These 
skeptics argue that while throwing billions of $ at education and R&D will definitely 
have some effect, innovation is not something that you can mandate, develop, or buy at a 
whim. According to Sternberg one need only “Scratch the surface of China’s impressive 
metrics, such as patent filing data, and there is often less genuine innovation there than 
meets the eye.”29 Sternberg also concludes that multinational corporation (MNC) interest 
in R&D in China has been driven more by market forces than by any government 
                                                 
28 2013 Global R&D Funding Forecast (Rockaway, NJ: Advantage Business Media, R&D Magazine, 
Battelle, December 2012), 29. 
29 Joseph Sternberg, “China’s Innovation Future? Market Forces are Driving an Uptick in R&D 
Activity, Independent of Beijing’s High-profile Plans,” Wall Street Journal (Online), (13 OCT 2011), 
accessed 15 FEB 2013, http://search.proquest.com/docview/897466162?accountid=12702. 
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policies. He estimates that it will take several more five-year plans before China is able to 
actualize its desire to become a R&D powerhouse. 
In 1995, China’s high-tech exports accounted for only 2.1% of the global market. 
During this same time China’s total high-tech exports were equivalent to only 8% of what 
the United States was exporting in 1995. However, in 2006 China supposedly surpassed 
all other nations to become the world’s leading exporter of high-tech goods.30 According 
to Yuqing Xing these often quoted statistics are overinflated and distort the reality of 
China’s ability to produce high-tech products.31 
Most of the skeptics think that China is making progress toward becoming an 
“innovation-oriented society” by 2020, but that it will take much more time to meet its 
goals. Other reasons cited for China’s obstacles in innovation include: cultural and 
societal pressures punitive to the failures inherent in the invention process; as well as the 
inability of the Chinese higher education system to produce S&T graduates ready to 
succeed in the MNC environment.  
c. The U.S. is in Peril of Falling Behind 
There is a steady stream of more conservative pundits that see China’s potential 
for innovation as a significant threat to the U.S. economy. One example, Clyde 
Prestowitz, asserts that laissez-faire economics and free-market policies have led to U.S. 
economic decline. He subtly blames China for also contributing through its policies such 
as “Indigenous Innovation.”32 Along a similar vein, Robert Atkinson asserts in that China 
has adopted an innovation mercantilist approach to gain not just competitive advantage 
but absolute advantage over the United States and the rest of the world.33 Atkinson has 
acted as a lead advisor to several U.S. government administrations regarding innovation 
                                                 
30 Thomas Meri, “China Passes the EU in High-tech Exports,” Science and Technology, Eurostat 
Statistics in Focus (2009): 2. 
31 Yuqing Xing, “The People’s Republic of China’s High-Tech Exports: Myth and Reality,” ADBI 
Working Paper Series, Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute, paper #357,(2011), 1–2, accessed 10 
JAN 2013, http://www.adbi.org/working-paper/2012/04/25/5055.prc.high.tech.exports.myth.reality/. 
32 Clyde Prestowitz, The Betrayal of American Prosperity: Free Market Delusions, America’s 
Decline, and How We Must Compete in the Post-Dollar Era (New York: Free Press S.& S. 2010), 15–16. 
33 Ibid., 200.  
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policy and has provided testimony at numerous hearings related to China’s “Indigenous 
Innovation” policies and its ramifications on U.S. China-relations.34  
The literature produced by this group has a highly politicized tone and tends to 
over exaggerate the significance of statistics such as the “China accumulated $3.2 trillion 
worth of foreign exchange reserves and [the] $276.5 billion trade surplus with the United 
States.”35 Although these are impressive numbers they have practically nothing to with 
the “Indigenous Innovation” policy as is claimed by Prestowitz and Atkinson.  
Many of the pessimistic claims sound similar to those made in the 1980s as the 
trade deficit grew between the United States and Japan. In 1983, the following statement 
was made in “A Nation at Risk,” a federally commissioned report regarding slipping 
national education standards: “our once unchallenged preeminence in commerce, 
industry, science, and technological innovation is being overtaken by competitors 
throughout the world.” As was seen in the case of Japan much of the rhetoric is out of 
proportion related to the size of the issues.  
d. The United States Maintains Dominance  
Many scholars categorize China’s “Indigenous Innovation” policy as non-
threatening either because they think that China is incapable of innovation anytime soon 
or because they see innovation in China as a contribution to global good. Some claim that 
China has made it possible for more developed countries to get farther ahead in 
innovation and global commerce. Many in this school of thought feel that China has great 
potential for innovation. Edward Steinfeld specifically asserts that China is innovating 
with the help of and through MNCs, and therefore everyone is winning. 36  
The pundits that fall in this camp claim that simple statistical evaluation of 
numbers of college graduates and export metrics are not enough to determine if China is 
                                                 
34 Assessing China’s Efforts to Become an “Innovation Society” – A Progress Report, Hearing Before 
The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 112 Cong. 2 (May 10, 2012), 8. 
35 Robert D. Atkinson, Enough is Enough: Confronting Chinese Innovation Mercantilism 
(Washington, DC: The Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, February 2012), 5. 
36 Edward S. Steinfeld, Playing our Game: Why China’s Economic Rise Doesn’t Threaten the West 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 172–174. 
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becoming a technology superpower on par with the United States.37 Further statistics 
cited by some in this camp illustrate that if China was to seriously pursue catching up to 
the global military leaders it would need to dedicate significantly more resources than it 
presently does. One example is just how far behind China is in S&T expenditures. In the 
late 90s, China only spent 5% of what the U.S. did on military S&T.38 
e. China is Catching Up but the U.S. is Still in the Lead 
This view of China’s efforts at innovation seems to be the most rounded of all the 
literature. This group of scholars account for progress that China has made without 
demonizing China for its efforts and without dismissing the potential threat of 
“Indigenous Innovation” policies. They admit that the U.S. share of global innovation has 
dwindled but the game has changed and we can continue to lead if we proceed with 
caution. This group is split into two sub-groups categorized by those that find China has 
major obstacles preventing them from becoming an innovative nation, and those that see 
that China is already an innovative nation or soon will be. 
Those that find China has major obstacles standing in the way of innovation cite 
several key reasons. One of the reasons noted was that the Chinese have self-identified an 
absence of a “culture of creativity.”39 This phrase is describing traditional social 
pressures that have made professionals risk averse and failure avoidant. This in turn has 
limited the innovative spirit. They claim that although R&D expenditures have gone up, 
China is nowhere close to U.S. spending on R&D. The labor pool is inadequate to answer 
the needs for R&D and S&T on the scale desired by the government (see Table 3). The 
high numbers of graduates do not mean that they are ready for employment at the level 
                                                 
37 C. Fred. Bergsten, Bates Gill, Nicholas R. Lardy, and Derek Mitchell, China–the Balance Sheet : 
What the World Needs to Know Now about the Emerging Superpower (New York: Public Affairs, 2007), 
99–107. 
38 Tai Ming Cheung, “The Chinese Defense Economy’s Long March from Imitation to Innovation,” 
Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 3 (June 2011): 325–354. 
39 Denis Fred Simon, and Cong Cao, “China’s Emerging Science and Technology Talent Pool: A 
Quantitative and Qualitative Assessment,” in Henry S. Rowen et al., eds., Greater China’s Quest for 
Innovation (Stanford, CA: Shorenstein Center, 2008), 181–196.  
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needed for high technology R&D. Cultural, political and social factors will continue to 
inhibit China in its quest for “Indigenous Innovation.”40 
Table 3.   China’s Human Resources in S&T (thousands of persons per year) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Scientific personnel 2,905 3,224 3,140 3,222 3,284 3,481 3,815 4,132 
Scientists and Engineers in 
scientific activities 
1,595 2,046 2,072 2,172 2,255 2,252 2,561 2,798 
R&D personnel 822 922 957 1,035 1,091 1,153 1,365 1,502 
Scientists and Engineers in R&D 
activities 
531 695 743 811 862 926 1,119 1,224 
 
Source: Simon, and Cao, “China’s Emerging Science and Technology Talent Pool”41  
Those scholars that see China on the cusp of becoming an innovation nation have 
a different interpretation of many of the same statistics relating to growing numbers of 
engineering graduates and percentage increases of spending on R&D. “China is estimated 
to have produced 600,000 college and technical school graduates in science and 
engineering in 2004, whereas the United States produced an estimated 70,000 graduates 
the same year.”42 Although there is a shortage in the S&T labor pool there are many 
professionals currently in education and training. The positive effects of increases in 
R&D spending are just around the corner. The high numbers of patents are indicators of 
innovation in China. The literature in this category is potentially too optimistic on the 
side of China succeeding in innovation and does not take into account the implications of 
                                                 
40 Henry S. Rowen et al., eds., Greater China’s Quest for Innovation (Stanford, CA: Shorenstein 
Center, 2008), 194. 
41 Ibid., 184. 
42 Alan WM Wolff, “China’s Drive Toward Innovation,” Issues Online in Science and Technology, 
National Academy of Science (2007), accessed 19 September 2012, www.issues.org/23.3/wolff.html. 
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the statistics in relation to the population of China. Another problem with this group is 
the failure to indicate the global impact of China’s “Indigenous Innovation” policy. 
f. Conclusion of Literature Review  
The literature available on the subject of China’s “Indigenous Innovation” policy 
and its impact on other nations is broad in its scope and specific in multiple areas. The 
body of literature provides a balanced view of multiple opinions and theories. Not only 
are there multiple peer-reviewed articles and books available but there are numerous 
news reports and government documents regarding “Indigenous Innovation.” As certain 
pundits draw judgments regarding whether China is over-innovating or under-innovating 
there remains a gap in the literature discussing what the appropriate level of innovation is 
for developing nations. This thesis will not address this but will address gaps in the 
literature assessing the effectiveness of China’s “Indigenous Innovation” policy and its 
effects on U.S.-China relations. 
B. HOW DOES INNOVATION AFFECT ECONOMIC GROWTH? 
1. Growth through Innovation 
Political economist Friedrich List, in his book on The National System of Political 
Economy, was one of the first in his field to place significant emphasis on the role of 
science, technology, and skills in economic growth. He criticized the classical economists 
such as Adam Smith for focusing so heavily on capital accumulation and labor and not 
paying enough attention to technology and skill. List advocated policies to aid in the 
acquisition, learning, and application of new technology.43 These principles are at the 
foundation of China’s new policy for innovation. Since WWII economists have generally 
accepted as common knowledge that innovation is a necessary component of economic 
growth.44 A general explanation of the relation of innovation to economic growth draws 
                                                 
43 Friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy (English edn, London: Longman, 1904) 
1941.  
44 Lowell W. Steele, Managing Technology, The Strategic View (New York: McGraw Hill, 1989), 
265. 
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from the Endogenous Growth Theory.45 This theory asserts that growth is a product of 
human capital, physical capital, and Total Factor Productivity (TFP). TFP is a measure of 
technology, innovation, and labor productivity. Therefore, as a nation increases 
innovation its economy grows. 
2. What Are the Different Types of Technological Innovation? 
There are many different types of innovation related to technology as shown in 
Table 4, however most types of technological innovation that are commonly referred to in 
the discussion of innovation and its impact on economic growth can be categorized into 
the following three basic types of innovation. The first, and most commonly understood 
type, is innovation through invention or major breakthrough. “Break-through 
innovation,” as described by Dr. Naazneen Barma, is more typical in developed nations 
with advanced economies. The second type of innovation is that of production chain 
innovation. Production chain innovation speeds up systems and processes and improves 
efficiency leading to higher output at lower costs. The third type of innovation is 
incremental innovation, which improves on existing products in some way.46 Both 
production chain innovation and incremental innovation are common in developing 
economies such as China.47 
                                                 
45Paul Romer, “Endogenous Technological Change,” Journal of Political Economy 98, no. 5 (1990), 
71–102. 
46 A more detailed description of innovation theory is given by Zhao, Xinli and Wenfei Gao in their 
article “The theory of innovation and its application in China.” They refer to J. Schumpeter’s 1912 
innovation theory. Schumpeter’s description of innovation is slightly broader than Barma’s including the 
following categories: (1)Product innovation, that is, producing new products; (2)Technique innovation, that 
is, adopting a new producing technique; (3)Market innovation, that is, opening up a new market; 
(4)Material innovation, that is, obtaining a new source of material or Semi-finished products supply; 
(5)Innovation of organization management.; Xinli Zhao and Wenfei Gao, “The theory of innovation and its 
application in China,” Management Science and Engineering, 2008. ICMSE 2008. 15th Annual Conference 
Proceedings., International Conference on,” (2008), 1401,1408. doi: 10.1109/ICMSE.2008.4669090. 
47 Naazneen Barma, “The Emerging Economies in the Digital Era: Marketplaces, Market Players, and 
Market Makers,” in How Revolutionary Was the Digital Revolution? National Responses, Market 
Transitions, and Global Technology, eds. John Zysman and Abraham Newman, (Stanford University Press, 
2006), 149. 
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Table 4.   Specific Types and Examples of Innovation 
 
Source: Brian Rushton, “Strategic Expansion of the Technology Base,” 1986.48 
 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
There are three plausible hypotheses explored here to explain the effectiveness of 
China’s “Indigenous Innovation” policies. The first claims that “Indigenous Innovation” 
policies will fall short of goals and not add to significant economic growth in China, 
while the second concludes that China will experience successful economic growth 
spurred through “Indigenous Innovation,” and the third finds that “Indigenous 
Innovation” is irrelevant to continued economic growth. 
                                                 
48 Brian Rushton, “Strategic Expansion of the Technology Base,” Research Management November-
December (1986), 22–28. 
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1. Indigenous Innovation Flops 
In the first hypothesis, Indigenous Innovation Flops, multiple disruptive economic 
factors contribute to the shortcomings of “Indigenous Innovation.” The misallocation of 
investments and resources to non-performing sectors will stifle economic growth. 
Additionally growth might be slowed due to the demographic shifts in an aging 
workforce and rising social safety net costs. The impacts of environmental contamination 
from years of unchecked industrial pollution will draw money away from overall growth. 
“Indigenous Innovation” policies themselves may be too rigid in the current political 
structure to allow free market forces to take advantage and turn investments into growth. 
In short, Total Factor Productivity will not reach the levels necessary for China to 
experience the economic growth that it seeks through innovation policy. 
2. Indigenous Innovation Becomes China’s new Economic Engine 
In the second hypothesis, Indigenous Innovation becomes China’s new economic 
engine, the policies emplaced in 2006 payoff, allowing for continued growth as China 
transitions from an industrial to high-tech economy. In this scenario, there are three 
potential futures depending on how China’s policies and growth affect its relations with 
the United States. These alternatives are broken down in more detail during the literature 
review but can be summarized as: One, China’s “Indigenous Innovation” is a beggar-thy-
neighbor and mercantilist policy that threatens the U.S. economy and security; Two, there 
is no need for the west to worry about “Indigenous Innovation,” economic growth is not 
zero-sum and The United States will continue to be the best; or Three, the U.S. share of 
global innovation has dwindled and the game has changed but the United States can 
continue to lead if it proceeds with caution. 
3. Indigenous Innovation is Irrelevant for Chinese Growth 
In the third hypothesis, Indigenous Innovation is Irrelevant for Chinese Growth, 
China continues strong economic growth that would have happened independent of the 
2006 “Indigenous Innovation” policy. This rests on the debate between Neo-Classical and 
Interventionist theories. The Neo-Classical theory argues that China’s increased access to 
open free markets and increasingly free trade allowed for systemic self-corrections which 
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included market-driven innovation, leading to economic growth. Conversely the 
Interventionist or dirigiste theory claims that China’s top-down direct political 
intervention in “Indigenous Innovation” was necessary to direct policies that protected 
and fostered innovation leading to economic growth, through tax breaks, financing 
incentives, awards, and other means.49 
Neo-Classical theorists have argued that the growth and in this case innovation, 
would have happened despite or in spite of government actions. Interventionists contend 
that many other nations had as favorable or more favorable conditions but stagnated 
during the same period of China’s innovation-driven growth. Chalmers Johnson, in an 
evaluation of the neighboring successful economies of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, 
correctly pointed out that there were many factors other than government manipulation 
that contributed to these “miracle” economies, however without the government 
manipulation in several specific and key areas the other variables would not have been 
enough to bring about the astounding growth of these nations. Other economists argue 
that these nations simply oriented their policies correctly in order to benefit from market-
led growth and were also very fortunate to enjoy open American markets and U.S.-
subsidized security in the geopolitical context of the time. Johnson argues that despite 
other variables contributing to their rapid growth, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan all 
made it possible by control and direction from their governments.50 
4. Summary of Hypotheses 
The reality of the common circumstances and actions found in China’s 
innovation/modernization and economic growth model are a mix of both theories. Some 
have identified these circumstances and called it the Beijing Consensus, inferring that 
China set in motion a grand plan that brought about its economic growth and that this can 
somehow possibly be held up as a model for economic growth to be employed by other 
                                                 
49 Alice Amsden, “Why Isn’t the Whole World Experimenting with the East Asian Model to 
Develop?: Review of The East Asian Miracle,” in World Development, vol. 22, no. 4 (1994): 628. 
50 Chalmers Johnson, “Political institutions and economic performance,” in The Political Economy of 
the New Asian Industrialism, ed. Fredric Deyo (1987), 136–164.  
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developing nations.51 This Beijing Consensus would be an alternative to the Washington 
Consensus which is described as a more conventional free-market approach to economic 
development.52 Critics of the Beijing Consensus, including many in China itself, claim 
that there was no grand scheme or “consensus” and that the unique set of circumstances 
for China’s rapid growth may not be applicable as a model.  
Despite the criticisms of central planning, China’s leaders have taken a concerted 
introspective evaluation of their national growth trajectory, asking in particular what 
approaches might be applicable to future growth. Following its analysis and hedging 
against divergent theories for economic growth China has adopted a dual track policy 
approach to continued growth. One track embraces the rigid government planning, top-
down direction that mandates growth through policy and the other embraces more liberal 
free-market approach to growth providing incentives and investment to enable a bottom-
up fostered growth. This is the same method applied in China’s National Innovation 
System (NIS) and incorporated into “Indigenous Innovation.” This approach brings 
scoffs from both sides of the Neo-Classical and Interventionist economic growth theories 
debate, as it does not fully embrace either but attempts to blend the two. This may seem 
like China is betting on all the horses in a race rather than picking a likely winner but in 
the case of economic development their broad investment, unlike in a horse race, is likely 
to bring an overall net gain. 
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
China’s drive to become an innovative nation by 2020 affects not only its 
economy but also the rest of the world. As China strives for innovation as a sustainable 
impetus for growth it is likely to achieve this end. China’s dual track policy approach to 
continue growth may waste money on ineffective actions but hedges against failure of 
any one track. China has already achieved growth through incremental innovation in 
                                                 
51 Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus: Notes on the New Physics of Chinese Power 
(London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2004), available at: http://www.fpc.org.uk. 
52 John Williamson, “What Washington means by policy reform,” in John Williamson, ed., Latin 
American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 
1990), 8, available at: http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/print.cfm?ResearchId=486&doc=pub. 
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manufacturing. Incremental innovation, combined with other policies adapted prior to 
2006, has continued to drive growth through 2013. China’s economic growth from 2006–
2013 has had little to do with “Indigenous Innovation” but has occurred irrespective of 
these policies. Influencing innovation is something that takes governments years to 
achieve and China’s future innovation and growth will likely be influenced by 
“Indigenous Innovation.”  
After the first eight years of “Indigenous Innovation” analysis of the output 
indicators and desired outcomes show that China’s Indigenous Innovation Flops. Even 
though “Indigenous Innovation” has contributed to raising the levels of innovation and 
economic growth in China it is off-track to meet the goals of the 2006–2020 MLP. 
“Indigenous Innovation” is not yet the new economic engine China hoped it would be, 
but it is a broad strategic approach that will have long-lasting effects in the future. 
Innovation is driving growth in China; however, as shown by the details of patent filing 
statistics, it is mostly market-driven incremental and manufacturing innovation and not 
the invention or new product innovation that China is seeking. China is likely to reach its 
innovation benchmarks but not until 10 years after its initial target dates. China must 
adjust its policy to focus more on the university-private enterprise R&D nexus and ease 
societal/cultural pressures to be risk averse and failure avoidant, to possibly turn its 
modernization in the right direction coming closer to achieving its goals for innovation.  
1. Organization of Thesis 
This thesis addresses first the importance of “Indigenous Innovation” for China 
and the ideas, explanations and theories already available in literature. The next two 
sections (B and C) of Chapter I will explore the main assertions on how innovation 
effects economic growth and China’s chances for achieving this growth through 
“Indigenous Innovation.” Chapter II will explain the nature of innovation modernization 
in China including “Indigenous Innovation” policies. Following these explanations, 
chapter three presents data to help assess improvements in innovation and economic 
performance and examines the effect of “Indigenous Innovation” policies on this 
performance so far. Based on a survey of the literature (Battelle, Stembridge and Zhou, 
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Wolff, and Meri), I rely upon five primary indicators in assessing China’s level of 
innovation Chapter III provides an assessment of the validity of these indicators, which 
are: expenditures on R&D, patent filing statistics, talent pool of S&T scientists, academic 
and scholarly articles published, and high-tech exports. Using these indicators this 
chapter assesses each, prior to and after 2006, to see if they point to one of the three 
potential effects of “Indigenous Innovation” on China’s economic performance; 
Indigenous Innovation Flops, Indigenous Innovation becomes China’s Economic Engine, 
and Indigenous Innovation is Irrelevant for Chinese Growth. It also includes the 
assessment that China is growing regardless of “Indigenous Innovation” but that future 
growth will be impacted by China’s current actions under this policy. Last, Chapter IV 
assesses the impact of “Indigenous Innovation” on Sino-U.S. relations and concludes 
with an evaluation of China’s current state of innovation and the feasibility of achieving 
the MLP goals. 
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II. REVIEW OF CHINA’S INNOVATION POLICIES  
“Indigenous Innovation” was not China’s first attempt at innovation but was the 
most recent iteration of China’s planning model for continued economic growth. This 
chapter explains why China cares about innovation, what policies existed prior to 2006, 
the details of China’s “Indigenous Innovation” policies launched in 2006 and the desired 
impact of these policies on China’s economy. 
A. WHAT HAS CHINA DONE TO PURSUE INNOVATION? 
1. What Does Innovation Mean to China? 
Wen Jiabao expressed that “science is the ultimate revolution,” using communist 
ideological rhetoric to put in perspective just how important S&T innovation is to China. 
Statements such as this tie innovation back to Mao and the drive for continuous 
revolution. Although rhetoric may be used to inspire the Chinese people it is couched in 
the reality that without ongoing advancement in S&T China will be faced with a likely 
economic slowdown and possible recession.  
a. Extraordinary Growth 
Over the last 20 years, China had the highest average annual economic growth 
rate at 10.2% equating to approximately 40% of global growth during this period. China 
is now the world’s second-largest economic power, behind the United States, and is 
estimated to cross over and become the world’s largest economy by 2025. China now has 
the largest number of millionaires (1,020,000) and billionaires (115) of any nation. This 
staggering and unprecedented economic growth has been fueled by an abundance of low-
cost labor driving massive industrial manufacturing. In 2011, China was the world’s 
leading exporter of manufactured goods.53  
                                                 
53 David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2013), 156–157. 
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b. Growth without Change Destined to Slow 
If China were to remain the world’s factory, churning out low-cost goods, it 
would inevitably experience economic slowdown due to multiple factors. First and 
foremost, growth on the basis of human and physical capital deployment inevitably  
hits diminishing returns. In addition, along with the unprecedented growth experienced 
by China, came the accompanying issues of resource consumption, pollution, and 
increased need for social welfare. In 2011, China accounted for 71% of global energy 
consumption growth (see Figure 1).54 Such massive consumption of fossil fuels has had 
significant impacts on the environment. In 2005, Yongjin Zhang estimated that annual 
environmental impact of China’s industrialization amounted to between $130 billion and 
$200 billion.55 Facing increasing wages and an aging workforce, China is set for some 
major hurdles related to taking care of its population of 1.3 billion in the next 10 years. 
According to China’s National Bureau of Statistics the working age population shrank for 
the first time in 2012 by approximately 3.45 million. It is estimated that in 10 years China 
will lose 21% of its male population between the ages of 15–24 (approximately 38m). 
Such a large loss in income earners will have a significant impact on the large aging 
retired population that they are supporting.56 
                                                 
54 BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2012, BP, (2012), 2. accessed 16 FEB 2013, 
http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview.  
55 Yongjin Zhang, China Goes Global (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2005), ix. 
56 “China’s population: Peak toil,” The Economist (26 January 2013). 
 27
 
Figure 1.  China’s Primary* Energy Consumption  
from 2001–2011 Measured in MTOE 
Source: BP (2012) *Primary energy consists of Coal, Oil, Natural Gas, Hydroelectric, Nuclear, and other 
Renewables.57 
c. Growth Challenges Are Met by the Best Laid Plans 
Modeled after Soviet style central planning, the PRC began its efforts at 
modernization shortly after taking power 1949. These plans for technological 
development were incorporated into five year plans, the first of which appeared in 1956. 
The S&T modernization model set forth in these plans were characterized as highly 
bureaucratic and hierarchical. The industrialization and agricultural efforts of the Great 
Leap Forward, from 1958–1961, led to widespread famine. This model of centralized 
planning continued until 1965, and from 1966–1976 during the Cultural Revolution 
modernization suffered major setbacks, leading to the loss of a generation of scientists 
and engineers. China’s model for research was modeled similarly to that of the USSR 
with the Chinese Academy of Sciences in charge of basic research and the universities 
responsible for the development of human capitol. Even though China was able to 
develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles using this top-driven policy style it was 
overall detrimental to S&T development. This model of modernization was inefficient 
                                                 
57 BP Statistical Review of World Energy (London: British Petroleum, 2012), 2. 
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and lacked the benefit of a link between industry and research. After languishing for 
years under this model China reemerged under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in 
1978.58 
Along with Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms came a new system of research 
and innovation. Science and Technology was identified in Zhou Enlai’s Four 
Modernizations program (implemented by Deng in 1978) as essential to the continued 
modernization and economic success of China. In March 1978, Vice-Premier Fang Yi 
emphasized the importance of S&T and the reversal of past policies when he proclaimed 
that China “is entering a new stage of flourishing growth [in S&T] … The dark clouds [of 
the Cultural Revolution] have been dispelled … and the way has been cleared. A bright 
future lies ahead of us.”59 From that point China initiated a series of programs to advance 
S&T and innovation as well as to encourage opening to foreign direct investment (FDI). 
2. Policies Related to Innovation Prior to 2006 
Starting in 1978, with the implementation of the Four Modernizations program at 
the third plenum of the 11th Central Committee, China adopted a series of policies 
related to modernization leading up to “Indigenous Innovation” in 2006. After 1978, the 
Chinese government leaders knew that in order to have a more market driven innovation 
framework, the old S&T institutions would need significant reform. These institutions 
would need to establish and foster relationships with industry and universities. S&T 
institutions would need to be more open and collaborative. They would also need 
significant increases in R&D funding. Over the course of the next 25 years, China 
mapped out a series of policy actions incorporated into short-term 5 year plans, and 
medium- to long-term plans. These policies are best categorized into four periods: 
Reformation of Planning Practice (1978–1984), Performing the S&T activities in the 
“Market” (1985–1991), Bridging S&T activities closely to “Socialist Market Economy” 
                                                 
58, Charles W. Wessner and Alan Wm Wolff, eds. Rising to the Challenge: U.S. Innovation Policy for 
Global Economy (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2012), 211–212; Sylvia Schwaag Serger 
and Magnus Breidne, “China’s Fifteen-Year Plan for Science and Technology: An Assessment,” Asia 
Policy, No. 4 (July 2007), 138. 
59 Fang Yi, “Report to the National Science Conference (March 18, 1978),” in Chinese Science and 
Technology I (1), summer (1979), 9. 
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(1992–1998), and Large-Scale Transformation of R&D institutions (1999–2005). The 
details of each policy action and its intended goal or target are illustrated in Table 5 (also 
see Appendix A. STAGES OF NIS REFORM, for details on the progression of 
R&D/innovation reform).60  
Table 5.   Chinese Reform Policy for Public S&T Institutions: 1978–2005. 
 
Source: “Organization, Programme and Structure: an Analysis of the Chinese Innovation Policy 
Framework,” R&D Management 34, 4, (2004), 371.61 
 
The first post Mao era period of S&T policy reform, Reformation of Planning 
Practice, was kicked off by Deng’s speech at the National Science and Technology 
Conference of 1978, in which he emphasized the importance of S&T in the economic 
                                                 
60 Can Huang et al., “Organization, Programme and Structure: an Analysis of the Chinese Innovation 
Policy Framework,” R&D Management 34, 4 (2004): 367–371. 
61 Ibid., 371. 
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advancement of China. Following this renewed emphasis on S&T there was a draft 
Outline of a National Plan for the Development of S&T (later scaled back) that was 
supposed to direct implementation from 1978–1985. It was tied to the Ten Year Plan for 
the Development of the National Economy (1976–1985) both of these plans were scaled 
back from their original drafts.62 
The first major policy actions were seen in 1982 with the development of the 
National Program for Key Sciences & Technology Projects. This program, now a 
recurring component of the five-year plans, is designed to:  
Find solutions to the scientific and technological bottlenecks in the 
medium and long-term national economic and social development; 
promote the modernization of traditional industries and the optimization of 
industrial structures; support development of high technology and its 
industrialization; improve the quality of national economic development 
and people’s life; and enhance the nation’s S&T capacity.63 
Although it maintained focus on S&T the National Program for Key S&T Projects did 
not have the impact of later plans and programs.  
China recognized the weak nature of extant-R&D-infrastructure which focused on 
major SOEs and the defense industry, and in response implemented the Program on the 
Construction of National Key Laboratories in 1984. This program aiming to build world 
class research centers tied to universities and some state institutions has facilitated the 
construction of over 150 laboratories.64 
All major S&T innovation policies in China since the Cultural Revolution were 
based on four major decisions issued on S&T policy by the Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party. These were: 
 Decision on the Reform of the Science and Technology System, 1985. 
 Decision on Accelerating Scientific and Technological Progress, 1995. 
                                                 
62 Liu Li, “The Evolution of China’s Science and Technology Policy, 1975–2007,” in OECD Reviews 
of Innovation Policy: China (2008): 381–383. 
63 “Science and Technology Programs in China,” Consulate-General of the PRC–Chicago, accessed 
February 23, 2013, http://www.chinaconsulatechicago.org/eng/kj/t31882.htm. 
64 Ibid. 
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 Decision on Strengthening Technological Innovation and Developing 
High Technology and Realizing Its Industrialization, 1999. 
 Decision on Implementing the Medium and Long-term Strategic Plan for 
the Development of Science and Technology and Improving the 
Indigenous Innovation Capability, 2006.65 
a. The 1985 Decision  
The 1985 Decision marked the first large scale systemic reform of China’s S&T 
programs. This resolution, published by the Central Committee, set the directions, 
guiding principles and overall goals of reformation of the S&T institutions and systems in 
China. It included guidelines for reform in three principle areas: the operating 
mechanism, institutional structure and human resources / S&T personnel management.66 
The key programs initiated during the period after the 1985 Decision were: the National 
High Technology research and Development Program or 863 Program (1986); the Spark 
Program (1986); the Torch Program (1988); National S&T Achievements Dissemination 
Program (1990); and the National Program for Key Basic Research Projects or the 
Climbing Program (1991).67 
(i) 863 Program. Initial reforms in the 1980s included efforts to restructure 
state research institutions by picking winners and losers in an effort to allocate funds to 
key sectors. One of the first noted set of policies, implemented in 1986, was the State 
High-Tech Development Plan, also known as the 863 Program. This plan was the 
brainchild of four Chinese scientists that previously worked on Mao era strategic 
weapons. 863 was designed to give China independence from foreign technologies in 
areas such as satellites and computer processing. The Program also highlighted the 
importance of closing the gap between China and developed countries in high 
                                                 
65 Liu Li, “The Evolution of China’s Science and Technology Policy, 1975–2007,” in OECD Reviews 
of Innovation Policy: China (2008): 381–382. 
66 Liu Li, “The Evolution of China’s Science and Technology Policy, 1975–2007,” in OECD Reviews 
of Innovation Policy: China, 2008, 381–382; Xue, Lan, “A historical Perspective on China’s Innovation 
System Reform: A Case Study,” Journal of Engineering Technology Management 14 (1997): 67–81. 
67 “Science and Technology Programs,” Consulate of PRC Chicago. 
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technology. Highlighted by the program are eight specific fields in which China planned 
to focus their S&T: biotechnology, space technology, information technology, lasers, 
automation technology, energy technology, advanced materials technology and marine 
technology.68 
(ii) The Spark program. This 1986 program was designed to develop the 
rural economy through S&T. Spark was designed to improve labor production, through 
S&T, centered on newly constructed cities and towns. These locations were to become 
regional pillar industries.69 
(iii) The Torch Program. The primary objective of the Torch Program, 
initiated in 1988, was to create the critical nexus between innovation and R&D and 
industry. It focused on the commercialization of ideas in S&T. Along the lines of the 
Special Economic Zones the government, under the Torch Program, created 53 Emerging 
Technology Industry Development Zones. These centers were identified to receive 
special government funds, preferential tax policies, and priority in the receipt of bank 
loans.70 
(iv) The National S&T Achievements Dissemination Program (NSTADP). 
Starting in 1990, the NSTADP called for further integration of S&T into industry. It was 
designed to extrapolate further economic gain from S&T activities.71 
(v) The Climbing Program. Primarily designed to boost basic research, the 
Climbing Program of 1991, focused on areas deemed critical to S&T development. These 
areas included: mathematics, physics, chemistry, mechanics, astronomy, geography, 
biology, energy, materials, information and computer, basic agronomy, basic medical 
sciences, resource and environment, space science and engineering science.72 
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b. The 1995 Decision  
The Decision on Accelerating Scientific and Technological Progress stated that 
S&T is a productive force and a key to economic development as outlined by Deng 
Xiaoping. The resolution was to enable S&T and education to take its place as the 
primary driving force of the reform movement. The 1995 Decision was a continuation of 
principles outlined in the 1985 Decision plus the determination to expand basic scientific 
research to world-class levels. 73 
c. The 1999 Decision 
Focusing on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that further promoted technological 
innovation, the 1999 Decision promoted expansion and strengthening of innovation along 
with industrialization in the public sector. SOEs were expected to use high technology to 
modernize their processes and develop new products and services.74 
d. Summary of Pre-2006 Policies 
All of these modernization efforts from 1978 to 2006 had significant impacts on 
China’s economy and brought them forward to become the world’s second largest 
economic power behind the United States. This staggering and unprecedented economic 
growth has been fueled by an abundance of low-cost labor driving massive industrial 
manufacturing. In 2011, China was the world’s leading exporter of manufactured 
goods.75 More details in assessment of these policies are provided in the following 
chapter. 
                                                 
73 Cao, Cong. “Strengthening China through science and education: China’s development strategy 
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China’s Science and Technology Policy, 1975–2007,” in OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy: China 
(2008): 387. 
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e. The 2006 MLP Focused on Indigenous Innovation 
Despite significant advances in technology and modernization, China still faces 
major obstacles to sustainable development. OECD categorizes these obstacles as:  
i) social developments, that have not kept up with economic development, such as  
public health; ii) the disparity in standards of living between urban areas on China’s  
coast and rural areas in the Northeast and West, has increased with economic growth;  
iii) the negative environmental impacts of China’s rapid industrialization are taking a 
serious toll; iv) despite significant growth there are not enough job opportunities to 
support China’s massive population; v) low value-added products continue to be the 
primary source of growth; vi) China continues to rely on costly advanced technology 
from developed countries in order to catch-up; vii) and finally China has run such large 
trade surpluses with its trading partners that it faces frequent trade disputes, necessitating 
a new strategy to create sustainable growth.76  
3. China’s Adaptation of “Indigenous Innovation” Policy 
Hu Jintao, as the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Central 
Committee, introduced the implementation of “Indigenous Innovation” at the 2006 
National Conference on Science and Technology in Beijing with the following statement: 
China will embark on a new path of innovation with Chinese 
characteristics, the core of which is to adhere to innovation, seek leapfrog 
development in key areas, make breakthroughs in key technologies  
and common technologies to meet urgent requirements in realizing 
sustained and coordinated economic and social development and make 
arrangements for frontier technologies and basic research with a long-term 
perspective.77 
China’s new “Indigenous Innovation” policy was published as the Medium to 
Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology 2006–2020. This plan 
called for broad goals, such as boosting spending in R&D to 2.5% of GDP by 2020, and 
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catching up with developed nations in advanced sciences. Some of the significant 
programs and goals outlined are 11 “priority fields” of science, eight areas of “frontier 
technology” and a further eight areas of “cutting-edge science” (see Table 6).78 The MLP 
also called for the development of the following four major research areas of basic 
science: developmental and reproductive biology, nanotechnology, protein science, and 
quantum research. 
Table 6.   Focus Areas of “Indigenous Innovation” 
11”priority fields”  
 agriculture  
 energy  
 environment  
 information technology and 
modern services  
 manufacturing  
 national defense  
 population health  
 public security  
 transportation  
 urbanization and urban 
development  
 water and mineral resources  
 
Eight areas of “frontier 
technology”  
 advanced energy  
 advanced manufacturing  
 aerospace and aeronautics  
 biotechnology  
 information technology  
 lasers  
 new materials  
 ocean technologies  
 
Eight areas of “cutting-edge 
science”  
 cognitive science  
 structure of matter  
 core mathematical themes  
 Earth system processes and 
resources, environmental and 
disaster affects, chemical 
processes  
 life processes  
 condensed matter  
 new approaches to scientific 
experimentation and 
observation  
 research technologies.  
 
Source: CENTRA Technology, 2011.79 
 One of the most ambitions areas of modernization outlined in the MLP is the plan 
for 16 Major Special Projects or Mega Projects. China’s goal with the megaprojects is to 
leapfrog technology and decrease dependence on costly foreign technology.  
The 16 megaprojects proposed in the MLP are the following: 
 Advanced numerically-controlled machine tools and basic manufacturing 
technology 
 Control and treatment of AIDS, hepatitis, and other major diseases 
 Core electronic components, including high-end chip design and software 
                                                 
78 Charles W. Wessner and Alan Wm Wolff, eds. Rising to the Challenge: U.S. Innovation Policy for 
Global Economy (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2012), 215. 
79 China’s Program for Science and Technology, Modernization: Implications for American 
Competitiveness, prepared for USCC, (Arlington: CENTRA Technology, 2011), 42.  
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 Extra large-scale integrated circuit manufacturing 
 Drug innovation and development 
 Genetically modified organisms 
 High-definition earth observation systems 
 Advanced pressurized water nuclear reactors and high-temperature gas 
cooled reactors 
 Large aircraft 
 Large-scale oil and gas exploration 
 Manned space, including lunar exploration 
 Next-generation broadband wireless telecommunications 
 Water pollution control and treatment103 
 Numbers 14–16 are unannounced projects, thought to be classified.80 
 
Over the next 15 years, the plan is designed to setup the framework of a national 
innovation system. This framework is intended to put enterprises at the center of 
innovation. It also includes policy support for venture capital, improved protection of 
intellectual property rights, investments in infrastructure, human resource development 
and a promotional campaign aimed at promoting the public understanding of innovative 
culture.81 
4. What Will the Impact be if China Succeeds with Innovation? 
The outcome of China’s “Indigenous Innovation” plan will have a broader impact 
than just the sustained economic and social development of one nation. This plan can be 
viewed as a great experiment to answer many questions related to debates about S&T and 
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its impact on economic and social development as well as debates regarding government 
intervention and direction in national innovation systems.82  
If China succeeds in its goals laid out in the MLP it will certainly have risen to 
lead the world in innovation. Chinese society will have emerged as an innovative society 
that is centered on S&T.  
B. MLP OF 2006 “Indigenous Innovation” 
China’s new program of “Indigenous Innovation” focuses on achieving three 
major goals: i) Building an innovation-based economy by fostering the ability to 
innovate, ii) Fostering an enterprise-centered S&T innovation system and bolstering the 
innovative capacity of Chinese corporations, iii) Achieving significant achievements in 
specific areas of technological development and basic research. In order to achieve these 
goals the State Council announced policies covering four broad categories outlined in 
OECD’s report on innovation policy review of China:83 
 Enhancing R&D financing not only through enhanced public funding, but 
also through extended tax incentives for S&T, government support for the 
development of financial market funding channels, public funding to 
support the absorption of imported technology, etc. 
 Promoting innovation through improved framework conditions: active use 
of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, active participation in 
setting international technology standards, public procurement, and R&D 
infrastructure construction, including key labs, science parks and 
incubators, etc. 
 Enriching human resource in S&T by nurturing scientific leaders and 
talent and tapping into the global pool of HRST, including overseas 
Chinese, reforming higher education, and improving public awareness of 
innovation. 
 Improving the management of public R&D by introducing a new 
evaluation system and increasing policy co-ordination. 
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1. Top-down Policies 
Although China has made significant strides in creating a more innovative society 
it suffers from the burden of centrally planned policies that are characterized by a top-
down approach. The top-down policies of the MLP, some of which were previously 
mentioned, include raising the share of GDP dedicated to R&D to 2.5 % by 2020 from 
1.5 % today, and investing in eighteen science and engineering “megaprojects.”  
In an effort to create technological autonomy, or reduce the payment of licensing 
fees to foreign companies, China has focused on the development of competing 
technology standards. One policy to this end mandated that companies wanting to be 
included as recognized vendors in the government’s product procurement catalog would 
have to demonstrate that their products included indigenous innovation and were 
completely free of foreign intellectual property. Due to the global nature of product 
production this raised a number of issues; first, it was difficult to find adequate 
“Indigenously Innovated” product, second, this was highly prejudicial to international 
companies attempting to compete in China’s market; and last, China attempted to force 
international companies to hand over sensitive intellectual property if they wanted to be 
included in the catalogs. Ultimately due to intense international pressure China repealed 
some of the more discriminative policies.84 
2. Bottom-up Policies 
Recognizing the fickle nature of creating an innovative society China has adopted 
a multi-faceted strategy to this end. While it historically is more comfortable with 
centrally mandated policies and procedures China has created a bottom-up approach to 
fostering or cultivating innovation. These policies are based on the experience of Silicon 
Valley and centered on university-industry collaboration, venture capital, and small-start-
ups. Some of the basic provisions of these policies aim to: 
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 reduce the enterprise income tax for high-tech firms that invest heavily in 
R&D 
 provide financial support through soft bank loans 
 provide protection for intellectual property rights 
 focus on merit or peer-reviewed selection of research grant recipients 
Although China recognizes the importance of fostering bottom-up innovation it is still 
weak in this aspect of its NIS.  
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III. EFFECTIVENESS OF “INDIGENOUS INNOVATION” 
With the outcome of “Indigenous Innovation” potentially affecting not only China 
but the rest of the world, it is very important to fully understand the details and nature of 
this policy. Seven years have passed since the implementation of “Indigenous 
Innovation,” in China’s Medium and Long-Term Plan (MLP) from 2006–2020, long 
enough to make some preliminary assessments of its effectiveness and impacts. This 
chapter evaluates China’s innovation efforts both before and after 2006. There are five 
primary indicators widely used by economists in assessing a nation’s level of innovation. 
This chapter provides an assessment of the validity of these indicators, which are: 
expenditures on R&D, patent filing statistics, talent pool of S&T scientists, academic and 
scholarly articles published, and high-tech exports. Using these indicators this chapter 
assesses each, prior to and after 2006, to see if they point to one of the three potential 
effects of “Indigenous Innovation” on China’s economic performance; Indigenous 
Innovation Flops, Indigenous Innovation becomes China’s Economic Engine, and 
Indigenous Innovation is Irrelevant for Chinese Growth.  
Although increasing numbers of several of the indicators may correlate to 
concurrent actions and policies under the auspices of “Indigenous Innovation” this does 
not indicate that the increases are the result of the actions and policies. This chapter pokes 
holes in some of the faulty logic that have led some to conclude that innovation has 
significantly increased in China in recent years. 
A. ASSESSING INNOVATION 
China rests its future economic growth on its ability to increase levels of 
innovation and has worked hard to evaluate the effectiveness of its programs for 
innovation. It has attempted to evaluate innovation by measuring statistics of specific 
indicators. The reliability of statistics published by China regarding its economy has been 
frequently questioned. The Chinese government itself has recognized past problems and 
has revised figures and implemented reforms aimed at increasing accuracy. As China’s 
published statistical data is very pertinent to the evaluation of China’s ability to 
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implement “Indigenous Innovation” it is important to acknowledge that numbers cited in 
this thesis are subject to imperfections ranging from miscalculation in an imperfect 
system of the National Bureau of Statistics, or possible manipulation to protect political 
or economic interests. Most of the data in this report used for argument in evaluation of 
the effectiveness of “Indigenous Innovation” comes from the year 2000 onward and are 
not subject to as many of the cited errors or problems that plagued Chinese economic 
statistics in the past. Many recent laws and reforms have improved the accuracy of 
reported statistics.85 
Measuring innovation is extremely complicated. It could easily be compared to 
evaluating good verses bad dreams or counting the numbers of good ideas in a society. 
Changes in a nation’s level of innovation are very difficult to quantify. International 
economists and governments have gone to great lengths to measure innovation. Emerging 
from their efforts are five common measures of a nation’s levels of innovation: funding 
of R&D, patent filing numbers, numbers of S&T scientists receiving college degrees 
along with numbers of scientists employed in S&T, numbers of scientific articles 
published in academic journals, and numbers of high-tech exports (Battelle, Stembridge 
and Zhou, Wolff, and Meri). These output indicators do not translate directly to outcome 
indicators such as economic growth. This chapter will show that just because China is 
spending more on R&D, does not mean that innovation and economic growth will 
increase correspondingly. This thesis will compare each of these specific areas of 
measure from a pre-”Indigenous Innovation” baseline to the time elapsed since 
implementation of this policy. This comparison will weigh the validity of the numbers 
presented and present conclusions regarding indicators pointing to the outcomes listed  
in the three potential theories previously mentioned; 1. Indigenous Innovation Flops,  
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2. Indigenous Innovation becomes China’s new economic engine, and 3. Indigenous 
Innovation is Irrelevant for Chinese Growth. 
The MLP containing China’s “Indigenous Innovation” plan still has seven more 
years of implementation until its end in 2020. Therefore, the evaluations made in this 
thesis, unfortunately, can only be counted as an assessment of a work in progress. A fair 
assessment of the complete effectiveness of “Indigenous Innovation” will have to be done 
after 2020 and again after 2050 to assess the benchmarks set forth for these years. This 
thesis will suggest future indicators or trends that would reveal the realization of one of 
the three indicated theories. 
B. ASSESSMENT OF 2006 BASELINE 
Each of the indicators of innovation will be examined to show the trend of these 
indicators leading to 2006, and the subsequent post 2006 evaluation will show if the same 
trend continued without change, increased or decreased. In the 10 years before 2006, 
China experienced significant economic changes to include the transition from a planned 
market economy to a more market oriented economy. These changes led to a shift in 
funding for S&T with enterprises contributing more than government from 2001 onward 
(see Figure 2). This shift is hailed, by professors of the Zhejiang University School of 
Management in Hangzhou, as a move toward “Indigenous Innovation” and the overall 
goal of enhancing national innovation capabilities.86 This may be an overly optimistic 
view of innovation progress according to other Chinese scientists and scholars.87 
                                                 
86 Qingrui Xu; Suping Zhang; Zhiyan Wu; Shouqin Shen, “The 5 waves of indigenous innovation in 
China,” Management of Innovation and Technology (ICMIT), 2012 IEEE International Conference on, 
(2012), 5–10, doi: 10.1109/ICMIT.2012.6225770. 
87 Xinli Zhao and Wenfei Gao, “The theory of innovation and its application in China,” Management 
Science and Engineering, 2008. ICMSE 2008. 15th Annual Conference Proceedings., International 
Conference on,” (2008), 1401,1408. doi: 10.1109/ICMSE.2008.4669090. 
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Figure 2.  Increasing Share of Enterprise Expenditures on R&D 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook of Science and Technology (1999–2005).88 
 
1. China’s Expenditures on Research and Development Prior to 2006 
Along with incredible economic growth, China invested exceptional amounts in 
R&D for S&T. The decade long trend prior to 2006 showed spending increasing at a 
rapid annual rate of nearly 19% since 1995. In 2005, China’s R&D spending was the 
sixth largest worldwide at $30 billion (2006 exchange rates). This amount was equivalent 
to 1.34% of China’s GDP in 2005 exchange rates (see Table 7). 
Table 7.   GERD as a Percentage of GDP 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
China   0.57 0.57 0.64 0.65 0.76 0.90 0.95 1.07 1.13 1.23 1.33 
Japan   2.92 2.81 2.87 3.00 3.02 3.04 3.12 3.17 3.20 3.17 3.32 
United States 2.51 2.55 2.58 2.62 2.66 2.74 2.76 2.66 2.66 2.59 2.62 
Total OECD 2.07 2.10 2.12 2.15 2.19 2.23 2.27 2.24 2.24 2.21 2.25 
Source: MOST, S&T statistics website.89 
                                                 
88 China Statistical Yearbook of Science and Technology, China Ministry of Science and Technology, 
(1999–2005), 21. 
89 MOST, S&T statistics website. Ministry of Science and Technology, Accessed March 15, 2013, 
http://www.most.gov.cn/eng/statistics/2007/index.htm. 
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As acknowledged in its goals for “Indigenous Innovation” China still has a long 
way to catch up with or pass the United States in the amounts it spends on R&D. In 2005, 
only about one-quarter of R&D spending went towards basic research and applied 
research while more than 75% was devoted to experimental development. When 
comparing the statistics from China to those of other countries, it is important to note the 
massive difference in total population size. With nearly 20% of the world’s population 
residing in China, the per-capita ratio lowers the magnitude of amounts spent on R&D as 
well as other statistics such as numbers of scientists, compared to other nations (see 
Figure 3). With significantly more spent on experimental development than on research 
China was less likely to develop many patents. 
 
Figure 3.  World of R&D 2004 
Source: 2005 Global R&D Report, Battelle, R&D Magazine.90 
                                                 
90 2005 Global R&D Report, Battelle, R&D Magazine, OECD, World Bank, K4D, UNESCO. 
 46
2. Patent Filing Statistics Prior to 2006 
Despite record increases in spending on R&D the corresponding outputs remained 
relatively weak. Although China, during this period, was doubling the number of patents 
it was filing every two years (see Figure 4); an examination of patent filing numbers 
leading up to 2006 shows that China was still far behind developed countries in patent 
filings prior to 2006. 
 
Figure 4.  Patent Applications 1995–2006 
Source: MOST, S&T statistics website.91 
An evaluation of China’s patent numbers in 2006 show that in relation to the rest 
of the world, Chinese patent applications only accounted for 3% of applications filed 
under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO). Additionally only 11% of patents filed by Chinese firms were 
considered inventive (invention patents), compared to 74% of patents by foreign firms 
filing patents in China. 
3. Talent Pool of S&T Scientists Before “Indigenous Innovation”  
In 1995, China committed to bolster S&T through education and  build on old 
policies that over the previous 20 years aimed at strengthening China’s abilities in S&T. 
Subsequently other initiatives have focused on increasing national strength through 
                                                 
91 MOST, S&T statistics website, accessed 15 March 2013, 
http://www.most.gov.cn/eng/statistics/2007/index.htm. 
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talent. This focus on education and building a larger pool of S&T talent contributed to 
greatly increasing enrollment in higher education as well as the numbers of scientists and 
engineers working in R&D (see Figures 5 and 6). China historically suffers from a 
scholar diaspora problem often referred to as the “brain drain,” where Chinese citizens, 
highly educated overseas, choose to stay overseas and work rather than return to China. 
This means that some of China’s best and brightest are adding to the increase in 
knowledge and economic output of other nations. 
 
Figure 5.  Student Enrollments in Chinese Higher Education Have Risen Since  
1998 at Both the Graduate (purple) and Undergraduate (blue) Levels 
Source: NBS and MOST, 2006.92 
 
Figure 6.  Year on Year Increases in the Number of Scientists and  
Engineers Engaged in R&D in China 
Source: NBS and MOST, 2006.93 
                                                 




From 1994 to 2006, the number of Chinese university graduates jumped from 
almost 640,000 students to an astounding 3.77 million. This amounts to an almost six-
fold increase in just 12 years. Only the United States leads China in terms of total 
numbers of science and technology workers.94 According to Cao, Suttmeier and Simon’s 
assessment in 2006, although the numbers were increasing, the quality of China’s S&T 
talent pool was still lacking many of the overall characteristics that were frequently 
sought after by leading R&D industries.95 
4. Academic and Scholarly Articles Published Leading to 2006 
In the 10 years prior to 2006, China significantly increased its research output 
publishing astounding numbers of scholarly papers and journal articles. A chart showing 
China’s marked year-on-year increase in the number of publications in relation to the 
United States, the United Kingdom and the rest of the world, is shown in Figure 7. 
According to statistics published by the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), 
China increased the number of articles published annually from 26,395 in 1995 to 
153,375 in 2005 (articles counted in SCI, ISTP and EI).96 China’s share in the numbers 
of scientific publications across the world rose from 2% to 6.5% from 1994–2004. After 
the United States, China ranked second in the world with respect to publications on 
nanotechnology. Despite increasing publication numbers, China still lagged far behind 
developed countries in comparisons of numbers of times articles were cited in other 
works. This could indicate that although China is publishing high numbers of scientific 
articles they are not cutting edge or of interest to much of the rest of the international 
scientific community. When scientific articles published in China are cited with the same 
frequency of articles published by nations leading in innovation, this output indicator will 
more directly reflect actual economic growth through innovation.  
                                                 
94Denis Fred Simon and Cong Cao, China’s Emerging Technological Edge (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 146–147. 
95Cong Cao, Richard P. Suttmeier, and Denis Fred Simon, “China’s 15-year Science and Technology 
Plan,” Physics Today (December 2006), 40. 
96 SCI-Science Citation Index, ISTP-Index to Scientific and Technical Proceedings, EI-Engineering 
Index; MOST, S&T statistics website, accessed 15 March 2013, 
http://www.most.gov.cn/eng/statistics/2007/index.htm. 
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This lack of frequency with which Chinese articles were cited may have been a 
result of overly applied research or lower quality research or neither. It is unclear, based 
on the sources referenced for this section, what the specific reason was for the lower 
numbers of citations.97 Some researchers are quick to claim that the articles were cited 
less because of poor quality; however those claims are typically not substantiated with 
specific evidence.98 
 
Figure 7.  China’s Year-on-Year Growth in Numbers of Research Publications 
Source: Adams, King, and Ma. Global Research Report, China, Thompson Reuters, 2009.99 
                                                 
97 Ronald Kostoff et al., “The Structure and Infrastructure of Chinese Science and Technology” 
(Washington, DC: Office of Naval Research, 2006), 58. 
98 The research needed to evaluate the quality of Chinese articles compared to those of other nations 
that are cited more frequently is beyond the scope of this thesis. In order to accomplish a conclusive 
analysis it would be necessary to examine a number of Chinese articles on a given subject and non-Chinese 
articles on the same subject, evaluate them for quality and accuracy and then compare the number of times 
each was cited. To form a valid conclusion it would be requisite to repeat this evaluation for many articles 
written across multiple disciplines to establish national trends: Kostoff, et al., “The Structure,” 58. 
99 Adams, King, and Ma, Global Research Report, China (New York: Thompson Reuters, 2009), 5. 
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5. Numbers of High-tech Exports 
The numbers of China’s high tech exports rose significantly from $6.3 billion in 
1994 to $218.2 billion in 2005. Year-on-year increases of these exports are shown in 
Table 8. The European Commission published a report in 2006 claiming that China had 
passed the United States and Japan and become the world leader in high-tech exports. At 
face value it appears that China must certainly be increasing in innovation through this 
decade. The trend of China’s high-tech exports from 1995 to 2009 shows that from 1995 
to 2005, high-tech exports grew at approximately 30% annually, much faster than the 
growth of overall exports. However, when China’s high-tech trade numbers are examined 
in detail they reveal that a great portion of the high-tech products counted as exports first 
originated as high-tech components imported to China and then assembled into finalized 
products.100 
Table 8.   China’s High-tech Exports from 1995–2005.  




billions of U.S. 
$ 
10.1 12.7 16.3 20.3 24.7 37.4 46.5 67.9 110 165 218 
                      
Source: MOST, S&T statistics website.101 
Yuqing Xing claims that China’s supposed lead in technology is not due to 
technological advancement of indigenous companies; rather, it is the result of outdated 
statistic methods. According to Xing’s calculations 82% of China’s high-tech exports 
were of assembled products composed of imported high-tech parts from other countries. 
Therefore, the actual value added by China was merely cheap labor to assemble high-tech  
 
                                                 
100 Thomas Meri, “China passes the EU in high-tech exports,” Science and Technology, Eurostat 
Statistics in Focus (2009): 1.  
101 MOST, S&T statistics website, Ministry of Science and Technology, accessed March 15, 2013, 
http://www.most.gov.cn/eng/statistics/. 
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products.102 Another significant factor related to exports was that 88% of high-tech 
exports originated from foreign owned or joint venture companies operating in China. 
6. Overall Assessment of Status of Innovation in 2006 prior to 
Implementation of “Indigenous Innovation” 
The indicators of innovation prior to 2006 were all showing steady significant 
gains. Regardless of the gains of the input indicators, the output indicators still appeared 
weak. Furthermore, the shift from output indicators to actual desired outcomes of 
“Indigenous Innovation” is even further into the future. If adjusted for purchasing power 
parity (PPP), China’s GERD, at $73.5 billion, trailed only the United States and Japan. 
China’s R&D intensity, measured by a ratio of GERD to GDP, rose substantially; 
however, when compared to developed nations, it still lagged significantly. A 
mathematical assessment by Zhao and Gao in 2008 showed that the contribution ratio of 
scientific and technological progress in China was about 40%, while in developed 
countries the ratios were more than 80%. They also assessed China’s dependence on 
foreign tech at approximately 60% while developed countries dependence only measured 
around 20%.103 
It is no surprise that China had a long way to go to catch up with the developed 
nations in terms of innovation capacity. This is the main reason China adopted all of the 
policies and goals of the 2006 MLP. China was steadily increasing numbers of output 
statistics but needed to at the same time increase the quality of outputs and hence achieve 
meaningful innovation outcomes that could actually have the intended effect on 
economic growth. 
                                                 
102 Yuqing Xing, “The People’s Republic of China’s High-Tech Exports,” 3. 
103 Xinli Zhao and Wenfei Gao, “The theory of innovation and its application in China,” Management 
Science and Engineering, 2008. ICMSE 2008, 15th Annual Conference Proceedings, International 
Conference on” (2008), 1406, doi: 10.1109/ICMSE.2008.4669090. 
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C. ASSESSMENT OF TRENDS FROM 2006 TO 2013 
1. Assessment After Eight Years of “Indigenous Innovation” 
 China’s MLP that includes the “Indigenous Innovation” policy is a 15-year plan 
and some might question the validity of an assessment with seven years remaining in the 
plan. The important question is whether the output indicators that are evaluated here 
actually represent change due to implementation of the “Indigenous Innovation” policy. 
Based on analysis of the data evaluated within this thesis, it appears that the output 
indicators are valid; however, not all of them translate directly to the outcomes desired by 
the Chinese government. 
2. China’s Expenditures on Research and Development After 2006 
Booz and Company issues a yearly report on the top innovative companies around 
the world, The Global Innovation 1000. In the eight-year history of this report, it has 
found that, for companies, spending more money on R&D or innovation does not 
correlate directly to increased revenue. Instead, its findings show that in efforts to 
increase revenue through innovation, “what matters is how companies use … money and 
other resources, as well as the quality of their talent, processes, and decision making.”104 
The same logic rationally can be applied to national level R&D spending. Just because 
China is spending more on R&D, does not mean that innovation and economic growth 
will increase correspondingly. What matters most for China in creating an innovative 
society is how effectively China is managing its spending on R&D, how it is growing and 
leveraging its talent pool, and whether it is shaping its national innovation system (NIS) 




                                                 
104 Booz and Company, “The Global Innovation 1000: Making Ideas Work,” Strategy and Business, 
issue 69, (winter 2012), http://www.booz.com/media/uploads/BoozCo_The-2012-Global-Innovation-1000-
Study.pdf. 
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In realization of its goal to become a world leader in innovation from 2006–2013, 
China only increased its global share of spending on R&D by 2% (see Table 9). In the 
eight years prior to “Indigenous Innovation,” China increased its R&D spending as 
percentage of GDP by 0.68%. In the years following the announcement of “Indigenous 
Innovation,” China increased its R&D spending, as percentage of GDP, by only 0.26% 
(see Table 10). This indicates that the rate in which China is increasing its R&D spending 
has slowed during the same period China’s actual GDP growth has also slowed. This 
trend seems to indicate that “Indigenous Innovation” has not helped to increase R&D 
spending. In order for China to reach its goal of 2.5% by 2020, it will have to 
significantly increase the year-on-year spending increases on R&D.  
Table 9.   Share of Total Global R&D Spending 
Source: Battelle, R&D Magazine.105 
Table 10.   GERD as a Percentage of GDP 2006–2013 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
China 1.39 1.40 1.47 1.70 1.76 1.55 1.60 1.65
Japan 3.41 3.46 3.47 3.36 3.26 3.47 3.48 3.48
United States 2.64 2.70 2.84 2.90 2.83 2.70 2.68 2.66
Total OECD 2.25 2.28 2.35 2.40 2.38 … … …
Source: OECD, 2013, 3.106 
                                                 
105 2013 Global R&D Funding Forecast (Rockaway, NJ: Advantage Business Media, R&D 
Magazine, Battelle, December 2012). 
106 OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators database, January 2013; 2013 Global R&D 
Funding Forecast (Rockaway, NJ: Advantage Business Media, R&D Magazine, Battelle, December 2012), 
3. 
   2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013 
Americas  37.8%  37.5%  35.7%  34.4%  33.1%  39.1%  37.8%  34.8%  34.3%  33.8% 
U.S.  32.7%  32.0%  32.7%  31.4%  30.1%  34.7%  32.8%  29.6%  29.0%  28.3% 
Asia  37.6%  38.7%  36.9%  38.8%  40.8%  33.6%  34.3%  34.9%  36.0%  37.1% 
China  11.8%  12.8%  13.5%  15.6%  17.9%  11.2%  12.0%  12.7%  13.7%  14.7% 
Japan  13.0%  12.6%  13.0%  12.8%  12.4%  12.6%  11.8%  11.2%  11.1%  10.8% 
Europe  24.6%  23.8%  25.2%  24.6%  23.9%  24.1%  24.8%  24.6%  24.0%  23.4% 
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Despite its seeming stagnation in the overall ranking in the percentage-of-global-
R&D-spending, China now outspends every other nation with the exception of the United 
States. According to the 2013 Global Funding Forecast, by R&D Magazine, China will 
surpass the U.S. in R&D funding in 2020 (see Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8.  2022 Crossover of R&D Spending 
Source: 2013 Global Funding Forecast, Battelle, R&D Magazine, International Monetary Fund, World 
Bank, CIA World Factbook, OECD.107 
Continued GDP growth at approximately 8% will continue to fuel R&D spending 
increases allowing China to make these investments. However, as Figure 9 indicates, 
although China’s overall contribution to R&D makes it a world leader in spending, China 
is still far from its MLP goal of dedicating 2.5% of GDP to R&D by 2020. 




Figure 9.   World of R&D 2011 
Source: 2013 Global Funding Forecast, Battelle, R&D Magazine, International Monetary Fund, World 
Bank, CIA World Factbook, OECD.108 
 
The yearly statistical data in Table 10 also shows that while China is steadily 
increasing R&D spending, the rate at which it is progressing is likely going to leave it 
short of its MLP goals. Further evaluation showing the amount of R&D spending 
contributed by business expenditure indicates that China is becoming more innovative 
but that the rate has slowed since 2005. 
 
 
                                                 
108 Ibid. 
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From 2000 to 2005 China increased business expenditures on R&D 8.36% as a 
percentage of GERD and from 2005 to 2010 it only increased by 6.13% (see Table 11). 
Even if China does not meet its MLP goal of spending 2.5% of GDP on R&D by 2020, 
due to its rapid economic growth it already is and will continue to be a world leader in 
aggregate spending on R&D. In examining the evidence available, it is apparent that 
“Indigenous Innovation” is irrelevant to increasing spending on R&D. 
Table 11.   Business Expenditure on R&D (BERD) as a Percentage of  
Total National GERD 
  2000 2005 2010 
China 59.96 68.32 74.45 
Brazil 44.73 48.29 47.88 
India N/a N/a N/a 
s. Korea 74.05 76.85 74.80 
Russia 70.86 67.98 60.51 
Source: Adams, Pendlebury, and Stembridge, Building BRICKS (New York: Thompson Reuters, 2013).109 
3. Patent Filing Statistics after 2006 
In 2012, China became the world leader in patent filings. If numbers of patent 
filings were all that counted in measuring levels of innovation, it would seem that 
“Indigenous Innovation” was a sweeping success becoming China’s new economic 
engine (see Table 12). From 2006 to 2010, patent applications in China increased by 
16.7%. From 2009 on China showed double digit year-on-year growth in the number of 
patent filings. China now has filed six times as many patents as it did 10 years ago. 
Thomson Reuters projects that, by 2015, China will publish 493,000 patent applications 
annually.110 Even though China is the current leader in numbers of patents filed annually, 
it is still new to the scene of international patent filing and, as of 2011 only holds 9% of 
the PCT patents (see Figure 10).  
                                                 
109 Adams, Pendlebury, and Stembridge, Building BRICKS (New York: Thompson Reuters, 2013), 7. 
110 “China Leads the World,” (New York: Thompson Reuters, 3 January 2012), Accessed 16 March 
2013, http://thomsonreuters.com/content/news_ideas/articles/science/china-leads-the-world. 
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Table 12.   Trends in the Number of PCT Patent Filings  
for Selected Countries, 2006–11. 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
China 72.3 100 112.2 144.8 225.4 300.7 
United States 94.9 100 95.6 84.4 83.3 90.4 
Japan 97.4 100 103.7 107.4 115.9 140.1 
Germany 93.9 100 105.8 94.3 98.6 105.4 
Korea 84.2 100 111.8 113.7 136.9 147.9 




Figure 10.  Country Shares in Total PCT Filings, 2000–2011 
Source: OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 2012; data from WIPO Statistics Database, May 
2012.112 
Although its share of international patents is growing, the United States, Japan 
and Germany, still lead China in total numbers of patents held. As with the many cited 
statistics, high output does not mean and is not a substitute for high quality. Currently, 
many of the domestic patents filed by China are not invention patents but are imitation 
type “utility” patents which are much easier to file and are considered lower quality. 
Another problem with the claims that high patent numbers equates to higher levels of 
innovation, is that the numbers of Chinese patents are likely inflated due to government 
                                                 
111 OECD, Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 2012, OECD, 2012. 
112 Ibid. 
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subsidies to pay for patent filings. In efforts to get Chinese companies to both innovate 
and protect intellectual property, the government has paid for companies’ patent 
applications. Although China is rising in patent quantity and quality, it still has a way to 
go to reach parity with developed nations. “Indigenous Innovation” is aiding in 
improvements in patent filing but this factor of innovation is not producing the 
endogenous economic growth China seeks.  
4. Talent Pool of S&T Scientists after Implementation of “Indigenous 
Innovation”  
China currently graduates more undergraduate level engineers annually than the 
United States, Japan, Germany, France, Taiwan and South Korea combined. Almost 
twice as many engineering Ph.D.s graduate from China than from the United States each 
year. In 2009, China had approximately 98 million people with degrees in higher 
education (see Table 13). From 2000 to 2005, the number of postgraduate students rose 
from 300,000 to close to 900,000; from 2005 to 2009, the numbers rose to 1.4 million. 
These figures indicate that numbers of postgraduate students have increased at a steady 
rate, increasing by about 600,000 every five years.113 
Despite this steady growth, the total graduate student enrollment rate remained 
relatively low at 24.2%. This is still lower than the United States even with the 
overwhelming numbers of graduates in China.114 This is yet another instance where the 
size of the population seems to distort the numbers and percentages. Even though China 
has rapidly increased the numbers of students and graduates receiving S&T degrees, it 
still suffers both from an equal diffusion of education, and from a general lack of quality 
among its graduates. Experts estimate that as few as one-tenth of China’s engineering and 
IT graduates are prepared or have the ability to work in the global outsourcing 
environment.115 China’s graduates still lag behind those graduating from top Western 
                                                 
113 USCC, Assessing China’s Efforts to Become an “Innovation Society” – A Progress Report, 
Hearing Before The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 112 Cong. 2, (2012) 
(Statement of Robert D. Atkinson, President, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation). 
114 Hu Angang, China in 2020: A new Type of Superpower (Washington, D.C: The Brookings 
Institution, 2011), 86–87. 
115 Bergsten, et al., China - the Balance Sheet (New York: Public Affairs, 2007), 103. 
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universities. For this reason, China still allows its top performers to attend international 
universities in hopes that they will return, bringing not only knowledge acquired but more 
importantly the creative spark that they fail to replicate in their own graduates. As China 
seeks greater access to Western technology and to improve its own capacity, it has sought 
to fix the “brain drain” problem. China now offers top-paying jobs and significant other 
incentives to returning diaspora. The combination of approaches increasing the depth of 
the bench of available scientists to innovate appears to be working. China employs more 
people in S&T research today than any other country.116 
Sometimes the pressure for returning Western-educated-scientists to produce 
results ends in falsified findings or phony products. In one instance, Chen Jin, a returning 
American-trained engineering Ph.D. caved to the pressure to create a native 
microprocessor. Chen had worked for Motorola after earning his doctorate; later, after he 
returned to China and started working at Jiaotong University, he passed off a Motorola 
chip as his own design. Chen was showered with titles and billions in research grants. He 
created several of his own companies and only after several years of this charade, did 
some of his work associates reveal his lies. China’s reputation as a leader in science was 
tarnished after lauding so publicly Chen’s “achievements.” Following this and other 
scandals, both MOST and CAS established procedures and policies to prevent plagiarism, 
fraud, and other moral issues that had become common in China’s science community.117 
One of the often-recognized shortcomings of China’s education system is its 
emphasis on rote memorization and lack of training in critical thinking and problem 
solving. China’s push to educate such great numbers of people has not reflected the 
demand and needs of the market. According to the 2012 World Economic Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness Report, China ranked seventh globally in primary education 
                                                 
116 Anil K. Gupta, and Wang Haiyan, “China as an Innovation Center? Not so Fast; An Impressive 
Volume of Patent Filings Conceals Serious Challenges to Beijing’s R&D Aspirations,” Wall Street Journal 
(Online), July 28, 2011, ProQuest (879544375). 
117 David Barboza, “In a Scientist’s Fall, China Feels Robbed of Glory,” New York Times, 
Technology, May 15, (2006), Accessed 22 March, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/15/technology/15fraud.html?pagewanted=all; The Lancet, “Reforming 
Research in China,” The Lancet, 369 (2007): 880, Accessed March 26, 2013, doi: 10.1016/S0140–
6736(07)60419-X. 
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enrollment. Despite this high ranking in numbers of students, China still ranked 35th 
globally in quality of math and science education.118 Despite great disparities in quality 
of education based on geographical location, China has greatly improved the levels of 
education of its people as a whole (see Table 13). While other programs and policies have 
done more for elevating S&T education than “Indigenous Innovation,” this indicator 
continues to rise. Based on the flat trajectory in the rate of increases in numbers of 
college graduates, coupled with “Indigenous Innovation” heavy focus on other measures, 
it is simple to conclude that China is increasing its innovative capability through 
education but this has had little to do with “Indigenous Innovation.” 
Table 13.   Educational Enrollment Indicators, 1990–2020 
  1990 2005 2009 2015 2020 
Senior secondary education           
Students at school (million) n.a. 40.00 46.41 45.00 47.00 
Students in vocational education (million)  0.22 n.a. 21.95 22.50 23.50 
Gross enrollment rate (percent) 21.9 52.7 79.2 87.0 90.0 
Higher education’           
Students at school (million)  3.82 24.00 29.79 33.50 35.50 
Gross enrollment rate (percent) 3.4 21.0 24.2 36.0 40.0 
Undergraduate at school (million) 1.97 8.49 14.06 15.20 16.20 
Graduate at school (million 0.09 0.98 1.41 1.70 2.00 
Education received by newly recruited labor (years) 9.45 11.3 12 12.7 13.5 
Continuing education on the job (million) n.a. n.a. 170 290 350 
People with a higher education (million) 16 70 98 145 195 
Source: Angang, China in 2020, (2011).119 
5. Academic and Scholarly Articles Published Post–2006 
According to Thompson Reuters, in the last five years there has been an 80% 
increase in the amount of annually published Chinese scientific literature. China is now 
second only to the United States in numbers of annually published scientific papers.120 
The Royal Society of the U.K. projects that China’s total research paper publications will 
exceed the numbers of U.S. published papers sometime this year. The same report 
                                                 
118 World Economic Forum, “The Global Information Technology Report 2009–2010” (2010), 
Accessed March 20, 2013. http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-information-technology-report-2009–
2010. 
119 Angang, China in 2020, (2011); China Education Yearbook 2010. 
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forecasts that this trend is likely to continue with China’s technical-paper global-
publishing share increasing to 22% by 2020 (see Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11.  Engineering Articles as a Share of Total S&T Articles 
Source: National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 2012.121 
Although some authors critique the quality of Chinese scholarly articles due to 
low numbers of citations, Chinese articles themselves are being cited increasingly. 
Thompson Reuters publishes a normalized citation impact report, which currently ranks 
China above the United States. Some of the past citation data was skewed because 
Chinese scientists preferred to cite international articles and not their domestic peers. At 
the same time, Chinese articles were not widely distributed internationally, limiting 
access and opportunity for Western scientists to cite them. In many areas, such as the 
material and natural sciences, China is now a world leader. 122 
In 2013, Thompson Reuters published a report that showed China’s progress in 
improving both quantity and quality of research papers. China increased its publication of 
research papers by 600% from 2000 to 2010, and the quality of these reports showed 
                                                 
121 National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators (2012), 
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind12/. 
122 2013 Global R&D Funding Forecast (Rockaway, NJ: Advantage Business Media, R&D 
Magazine, Battelle, December 2012), 29. 
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through citation statistics. Over 1000 of these papers were cited in the top 1% of their 
respective subject areas. 123 “Indigenous Innovation’s” contribution to higher publishing 
statistics is difficult to measure; however, it has had a likely significant impact in the 
increasing numbers. One issue however is that the incentives used to boost paper 
publishing likely introduced an inflated number of articles that does not correlate directly 
to the actual level of innovation. 
6. Numbers of High-tech Exports 
According to the U.S. Census Bureau the U.S. trade deficit in high-tech goods 
with China reached $94 billion in 2010. After China took the world-wide lead in high-
tech exports in 2006, the same year as the implementation of “Indigenous Innovation,” it 
expanded 80% to reach $492.4 billion by 2010 (see Table 14). The rate of increase from 
the five years prior to 2006 amounted to a 368% increase in high-tech exports. This 
slowdown in exports could be attributed to decline in world demand following the 2008 
housing bubble collapse in the United States and the subsequent recession. During this 
post-2006 period, it is difficult to directly assess how much “Indigenous Innovation” 
contributed to high-tech exports.124  
Table 14.   Numbers of High Tech Exports 2006–2012 





273.13  302.77  340.12  309.60  492.4  **  ** 
** data not yet available 
Source: The World Bank, World Databank, 2013.125 
                                                 
123 “Thomson Reuters Report Finds That Investment In Scientific Research, Innovation and 
Education Close Gap Between “Brick” And G7 Nations,” Thompson Reuters Press Release, (19 February 
2013), accessed 19 February 2013, 
http://thomsonreuters.com/content/press_room/science/thomson_reuters_report_finds_that_investment_in_
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124 The World Bank, World Databank, 2013, Accessed 23 March 23, 2013, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx; Yuqing Xing, “The People’s Republic of 
China’s High-Tech Exports,” 3. 
125 The World Bank, World Databank, (2013), Accessed 23 March 23, 2013, 
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According to Yuqing Xing, an expert on economics and China, the current 
method of measuring high-tech exports and imports does not have the expected relation 
to innovation or corresponding inputs such as investments in R&D. This is why, in 2006, 
while only contributing 1.5% of GDP to R&D and with a GDP only one-fifth the size of 
the United States, China nevertheless still surpassed the entire world in high-tech exports. 
If high-tech exports (as they are currently measured) were a good indicator of innovation, 
there would have been no way possible that this could have happened. The reality of 
China’s large numbers of high-tech exports is that 80%–90% of them originated as 
sophisticated components in other countries, to be assembled in China and then exported. 
China’s primary contribution to the majority of high-tech exports is labor. The innovation 
base that creates the majority of the value added in these products resides in the United 
States, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. A primary example given by Xing is a 2009 
Apple iPhone, which retailed at $179 but the value added by China only accounted for 
$6.50.126 
Another study, “Does Innovation Matter for Chinese Hightech Exports?” 
conducted by Fu, Wu, and Tang (2010), claims that the theory correlating innovation to 
high-tech exports is false. In examining multiple high-tech firms, they found that 
domestic firms with increased efforts in innovation did not experience any higher 
production output. Of the international firms analyzed with high production output they 
found that the “Indigenous Innovation” policy did not help them in creation of value-
added products. A counter to this argument might be that R&D and innovation activities 
have a much longer incubation period than the timeline in which these companies were 
observed. Value added from R&D conducted today might not show up in products for 
several years—Steve Jobs started working on the iPad nearly 10 years before it was 
released. It is incorrect to disregard the value of R&D and investment in innovation even 
if the results are slow to materialize. Many ideas are scrapped before they become 
inventions or products.127 
                                                 
126 Yuqing Xing, “The People’s Republic of China’s High-Tech Exports,” 3–6. 
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The effectiveness of relying upon the volume of high-tech exports to measure 
innovation is probably best summed up in China: the Balance Sheet: “evaluating the 
extent to which China is becoming a technological superpower involves far more than 
simply identifying China as the location in which seemingly more sophisticated products 
are assembled.”128 If high-tech exports were measured more accurately accounting for 
global production chains and the value added of each nation’s contribution to a product, 
then high-tech exports would be a more valid measure of a nations levels innovation. 
Currently, the examination of pre and post “Indigenous Innovation” high-tech export 
statistics shows that “Indigenous Innovation” neither helped not hindered production of 
these goods; supporting the hypotheses that “Indigenous Innovation” is irrelevant to 
economic growth (see Figure 12). 
 
Figure 12.  The PRC’s High-Tech Exports 1995–2010 
Source: Yuqing Xing, “The People’s Republic of China’s High-tech Exports: Myth and Reality,” ADBI 
Working Paper, (2012).129 
                                                 
128 Bergsten, et al., China–the Balance Sheet (New York: Public Affairs, 2007), 103. 
129 Yuqing Xing, “The People’s Republic of China’s High-Tech Exports,” 357. 
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7. Assessment of Indicators Post 2006 and Post 2013 
Of the five different relevant indicators of innovation measured both before and 
after 2006, three showed that “Indigenous Innovation” was irrelevant to their present 
outcome. These three indicators are: Expenditures on R&D because the percentage rate 
of increase has slowed; S&T Talent Pool because the rate of increases in numbers was 
steady across the implementation of “Indigenous Innovation;” and numbers of high-tech 
exports because the current measurement techniques are not adequately accounting for 
actual national levels of innovation. 
Of all the indicators, S&T talent pool increases was the most closely tied to 
increasing actual innovation and TFP. Although imperfect, it is probably one of the best 
measures of innovation. Even with the issues of the current Chinese education system it 
is rapidly improving and producing impressive results. However, just as innovation is not 
created overnight, these increases in education levels and numbers were the product of 
modernization plans long before the call for “Indigenous Innovation.” 
D. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING CHINA’S EFFORTS IN BECOMING AN 
INNOVATION BASED SOCIETY 
[Our new policies and plans have] led CAS to narrow the science gap with 
leading countries; however, the innovation gap has still not been narrowed 
much. 
—Xielin Liu, Director of the Research Center, of Management of 
Innovation, at the Chinese Academy of Sciences  
China is the likely location of the next innovation center, replacing Silicon Valley, 
according to a 2012 global tech innovation survey conducted by KPMG. Of those 
surveyed, 43% believed that Silicon Valley would no longer be the lead innovation center 
by 2016. The majority of respondents (45%) named China as the likely host to the next 
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innovation center.130 Regardless of the opinions of those in survey polls, China still has a 
very narrow view of innovation, and has a long road ahead to catch up with the 
innovation levels of Western nations. China continues to seek after breakthrough or new 
product innovation, and misses supporting other important types of innovation such as 
incremental innovation, production chain and system innovation. Another symptom of 
China’s narrow focus is that it fails to build a breadth of capabilities. 
China’s corporate innovation is lagging far behind top nations. In 2012, China did 
not have a single company make Thomson Reuters’ report on the top 100 globally 
innovative companies. China now leads the world in total numbers of patents; however, 
most of these (94%) are patents held only in China and this report is based on 
international patent statistics. Conversely, the United States protects 50% of its 
intellectual property internationally.131 This indicates that China is still slow to expand 
globally. 
China has failed to create any globally recognized brands however domestic 
filings of trademarks have surged since 2000, expanding to 450% by 2011. The numbers 
of Chinese trademark applications are now greater than applications of any other 
nation.132 One reason for the Chinese government’s emphasis on “Indigenous 
Innovation” and consumption is likely an aim to capitalize on rapidly expanding 
consumerism. China’s domestic market is rapidly growing and expected to reach  
$4.3 trillion  by 2015.133 What China continues to miss is the capitalization on bringing 
the many new ideas (patents) to commercial application and production. This remains a 
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problem due to the weak link between research institutions/universities and 
industry/corporations. 
China is set to overtake the U.S. as the world’s biggest economy in 2016 in terms 
of purchasing power parity (PPP), according to a March 2013 report by the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).134 According to research 
conducted by Booz and Company, surveying multi-national and Chinese corporations, 
innovation in China has reached the tipping point where compared to investments in 
other locations, investment in R&D in China is value-added. Their research further 
showed that innovation in China has gotten beyond market adaptation and is now in the 
realm of idea generation and fundamental research.135 Despite these expected outcomes, 
this thesis demonstrates that China currently still falls considerably short of developed 
nations in terms of innovation.  
In an interesting and relevant study conducted just this year, General Electric 
examined 50 countries for their comparative levels of innovation, examining 25 factors or 
indicators of innovation in three categories. It is not surprising that a large multinational 
corporation would have a much more sophisticated measure of innovation than those 
accepted and used by most governments. For each factor, all 50 countries in the study 
were compared and given a ranking. Then, based on these rankings, they were grouped 
into four group rankings that identified the countries in the top quartile, and bottom 
quartile. The 25 countries that by ranking happened to fall into the middle two quartiles 
were not identified for each factor. In summary, the overall rankings showed which 
countries made the top quartile and which made the bottom quartile. China did not rank 
well despite its focus and efforts on innovation—placing somewhere in the middle  
25 countries. In the rankings of individual factors, China only ranked in the top quartile 
three times. The factors where China made the top cut were: Burden of Government 
Regulations (not a positive ranking), Government Procurement of Advanced Technology, 
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and High Tech Exports as a percentage of Total Manufacturing Exports. In summary, 
China was in the bottom three quarters of every factor but two. This reinforces the 
conclusion that China is not close to meeting its goals in “Indigenous Innovation.” 
Looking forward to the future and the goals for the end of the MLP, it is of value 
to project what changes we will need to see over the seven years in order for these 
objectives to be met. Increases in R&D will need to be diffused down to the local 
government levels with research grants and money awarded based on merit and scientific 
peer review. An increasing portion of funding needs to be applied to basic research. 
Patent Filings need to have a more rigorous review and include more invention type 
patents instead of utility patents. The Chinese education system needs to reform in a 
manner that allows for more creativity, independent thinking and problem solving. S&T 
articles are on track with numbers and quality increasing and are only lacking perhaps in 
citation frequency and breadth of subject matter. High-tech export numbers although 
cited by many, will not be a relevant measure of innovation in the global market until the 
metrics are reformed. Without these changes, China will not become an innovative 
society on par with developed nations by 2020. 
An assessment of all the evidence available prior to and after the pronouncement 
of “Indigenous Innovation” points to a mixed outcome involving theories two 
(Indigenous Innovation becomes China’s new economic engine) and three (Indigenous 
Innovation is Irrelevant for Chinese Growth). Although these two theories seem quite 
different in their hypotheses, the mixed result is relevant for the following two reasons: 1. 
“Indigenous Innovation” is having an effect on innovation in China but the measured 
outputs have yet to translate to outcomes. The economic benefits that China is seeking 
through endogenous growth will take longer than their initial goals of the 2005–2020 
MLP. 2. Much of the innovation that will occur in China over the next 10–20 years is 
likely to come from market driven forces and not from central planning in the form of the 





Given the seven years that have passed since the implementation of “Indigenous 
Innovation,” this thesis has provided a preliminary assessment of the effectiveness and 
impact of these policies to promote innovation. This thesis asserts two of the three 
possible effects of “Indigenous Innovation” on China’s economic performance are more 
likely. The three possible outcomes are first, Indigenous Innovation Flops, which asserts 
that “Indigenous Innovation” is not an effective policy, does not bring the desired 
economic growth, and needlessly disrupts international trade, investments, and commerce 
by what has been deemed by some as “techno-national” policies. The second possibility, 
Indigenous Innovation becomes China’s new economic engine, posits that “Indigenous 
Innovation” is successful in bringing sustainable economic growth replacing the old 
economy dominated by foreign direct investment and low-tech manufacturing. The third 
possibility, Indigenous Innovation is Irrelevant for Chinese Growth, suggests that 
“Indigenous Innovation” policies had a negligible impact on China’s continued economic 
development and level of innovation. The changes that have allowed for continued 
growth of China were already happening and would have continued to happen without 
this policy. 
China’s “Indigenous Innovation” policy has made some minor contributions to 
raising the levels of innovation and economic growth in China but will likely fall short of 
the lofty goals of the 2006–2020 MLP. “Indigenous Innovation” is not yet the new 
economic engine China hoped it would be, but it is a broad strategic approach that will 
have long lasting effects in the future. Innovation is driving growth in China, however as 
shown by the details of patent filing statistics, this innovation is mostly market-driven 
incremental innovation and not the invention or new product innovation that China is 
seeking. China is likely to reach its innovation benchmarks but not until 10 years after its 
initial target dates. If China can adjust its policy to focus more on the university-private 
enterprise R&D nexus and ease societal/cultural pressures to be risk averse and failure 
avoidant, then it could possibly achieve its goals for innovation. It will only be a matter 
of time before China has its own “Google” or “Apple” like global-tech-giants with 
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regular breakthrough innovations contributing to endogenous growth. The remainder of 
this chapter focuses on the effect of “Indigenous Innovation” on U.S.-China relations and 
then follows with the final summary of the thesis.  
A. EFFECT ON U.S.–CHINA RELATIONS 
Many financial experts argue whether China’s pursuit of economic growth 
through its innovation strategies will inevitably lead to a souring of relations with the 
United States. Some scholars argue that competiveness in economics and innovation is 
zero-sum and there can only be one winner.136 Labor unions and their backers often use 
the overinflated statistics of the “high-tech” trade to stoke the fires of techno-
nationalism.137 
China has infused massive amounts of cash into R&D, trained record numbers of 
engineers, and offered many incentives to companies and individuals who invent and 
patent. Despite all of the PRC’s plans and efforts, innovation, at the level that it seeks, in 
goals set forth in “Indigenous Innovation” will remain beyond its grasp for the near 
future.  
1. Evaluation of Dialogue Prior to 2006 
Even prior to the establishment of “Indigenous Innovation” China was growing at 
astounding rates and professionals in the fields of international relations, economics and 
or political economics were discussing the implications of China’s rise (see Figure 13). 
The majority of the theories discussed regarding a rising China fell along the lines of 
Realist IR theory and Liberalism IR theory. Prior to 2006 China had already gained 
acceptance to the WTO its trade numbers were increasing as was its rate of growth. 
Liberal theorists argued that globalization was good and that the more 
connections and international organizations China was participating in the better. In a 
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2005 article by Youngjin Zhang of the British Foreign Policy Institute, China is 
characterized as occupying a difficult position in terms of global governance. Where on 
one hand it is unknown how willing China is to taking on the responsibility of global 
economic governance, on the other hand China, in its unique roles as a non-democratic 
state, the largest emerging market and a rising economic power, is a challenge for 
international institutions to handle.  
 
Figure 13.  China 1980 – 2005 Nominal GPD Growth 
Source: IMF Data Mapper; World Economic Outlook 2012.138 
On the other side of the spectrum Realists see China’s rise as a direct challenge to 
U.S. power either in economic terms or hard power military capacity terms. In the USCC 
2005 report to Congress, the commission found that overall the U.S.-China relation was 
trending negatively and without course correction was heading to conflict. The USCC 
further asserted that the United States must challenge China directly on issues where the 
two disagreed.  
                                                 
138 IMF Data Mapper; World Economic Outlook 2012, (2012), Accessed March 23, 2013, 
http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/. 
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The USCC outlined the major economic concerns extant at the time that continue 
to echo to the present. Manufacturers were under increasing competitive pressures from 
China exacerbated by an undervalued Renminbi (RMB), Chinese government subsidies 
supporting export production, repressive labor practices, and weak intellectual property 
rights enforcement. In addition to the competitive concerns of manufacturing was the 
growing U.S.–China trade deficit, which in 2005 reached $201.6 billion.139 
2. Evaluation of Clashes Regarding “Indigenous Innovation” Policies 
Following the announcement of “Indigenous Innovation” the usual voices crying 
out regarding Sino-U.S. relationship inequality, voiced their concerns that China was 
moving to techno-nationalism and mercantilism and was breaking its promises made 
through the WTO. Among the loudest of these voices is the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
that stated: “the plan is considered by many international technology companies to be a 
blueprint for technology theft on a scale the world has never seen before.” Citing plans 
for tweaking and adaption of Western technologies as well as to block Western products 
from government procurement catalogs and the mandate for foreign firms to turnover 
technology in order to gain market access. The U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission in their yearly report as well as in published hearings regularly 
denounced “Indigenous Innovation” due to its discriminatory nature. 
These more protectionist policies under the “Indigenous Innovation” label were 
protested by the U.S. China Business Council, the U.S. Trade Representative, the 
President of the United States, U.S. Commerce Secretary, U.S. Ambassador to China, and 
representatives from the State and Treasury Departments. Within the first few years 
following its implementation, every time a bilateral meeting took place “Indigenous 
Innovation” and its discriminatory policies were highlighted. 
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3. Examination of Changes to Policy or Law Related to or Affected by 
“Indigenous Innovation” Policies 
Even though there was great concern by international corporations and 
government leaders following the roll-out of “Indigenous Innovation,” the actual 
practices of the plan were not nearly as calamitous or damaging as many originally 
thought, nor have its outcomes been particularly threatening, as is assessed in this thesis. 
Following several years of complaints from both Chinese firms, MNCs and Western 
government leaders, China caved on some of the more rigorous parts of “Indigenous 
Innovation.” The U.S. Trade Representative reported in 2011 that China’s state council 
had announced a new measure requiring provincial and local governments to stop using 
Government Purchase Catalogs or any other measures tying “Indigenous Innovation” to 
any government procurement preferences.140 
Much of the initial angst over “Indigenous Innovation” has waned over time. 
Tensions surrounding “Indigenous Innovation” have eased substantially following 
China’s promises to drop the requirements to hand-over intellectual property in exchange 
for market access, as well as the roll-back of requirements for indigenous content as a 
pre-condition for placement of products in Government Purchase Catalogs. There 
probably would not have been so much attention given and protests made over the policy 
if it were not for the economic slump among Western nations in the years after its 
implementation.  
4. Examination of Current Dialogue at Bilateral Meetings 
Current bilateral exchanges at the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) no 
longer focus directly on “Indigenous Innovation” but some of its related issues. At the 
2012 S&ED both sides discussed best practices for innovation policies, possibly to avoid 
the pitfalls of past policies. Also on the table for discussion were: improving methods for 
measuring innovation, sub-national innovation policies, support to international R&D, 
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enforcement of IPR laws and regulations. 141 Other recent bilateral exchanges related to 
economics have focused on the protection of intellectual property which continues to 
plague China.  
China has struggled to change a “copy and tweak” culture developed over years 
of copying technology. This problem has sucked much of the life out of China’s 
“Indigenous Innovation” plans to invest heavily in R&D. Chinese firms have been slow 
to spend money on expensive R&D efforts when it is cheaper to buy technologies. These 
companies fear that they will be wasting time and money developing technology that will 
not be protected by IPR. This has held China back from developing a stronger innovative 
capacity. This is one reason China lags in its goal to increase investments in R&D to 
2.5% of GDP by 2020. For this same reason international corporations are wary of 
conducting joint ventures in China. China dominates the world in several specialized 
technologies that were obtained unscrupulously through joint ventures. Two examples of 
this are high speed rail from Japanese companies and wind turbines from General 
Electric. China recognizes the issues with IPR but it is something that will take time to 
fix. It will be a significant shift from the way business has been conducted for many 
years. 
B. SUMMARY 
An assessment of the global economic shifts over the last 10 years shows 
unprecedented growth in China quickly catching up and surpassing all but the United 
States in annual GDP. China has accumulated an unprecedented $3.2 trillion of foreign 
exchange reserves. In addition to holding the greatest amount of U.S. foreign debt, 
China’s trade surplus with the United States jumped from $83.05 billion in 2001 to 
$276.5 billion in 2011.142 According to Goldman Sachs China will earn nearly double 
U.S. GDP by 2050 (see Figure 14). This large deficit and trade imbalance cannot be 
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attributed to China’s innovation policies nor does it necessarily indicate that China seeks 
to dominate the United States through “absolute advantage.”143 Many of the “worries” of 
U.S. citizens regarding China’s “Indigenous Innovation” are based on distortions and 
misperceptions. Many critics exaggerate the potential impacts of “Indigenous Innovation” 




Figure 14.  The Ten Largest Economies in the World in 2050,  
Measured in GDP (billions of $ - 2006). 
Source: Goldman Sachs. BRICs and Beyond. Goldman Sachs Global Economics Group, 2007.145 
The Chinese Communist Party, in order to maintain legitimacy and power over its 
1.3 billion citizens, is forced to maintain a delicate balance regarding economic growth 
and international relations. Accusations and counteraccusations regarding economic 
policy have dominated headlines over the last several years. Both China and the United 
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States despite increasing interdependence continue to experience volatility in managing 
international relations particularly with regards to economic practices. When dealing with 
these hotly contested issues it is important not to label China or the Chinese government 
as an entity with monolithic intentions or motives whether they be malign or benevolent. 
It is vital to recognize that both comprise many individuals and entities each with their 
own motives and agendas.146 Constructive dialogue through international organizations 
and bilateral exchanges have proven their efficacy with the changes to “Indigenous 
Innovation” policies. Despite differences between the two nations, increased tensions 
have not translated to military conflict and U.S. China relations and interdependence have 
never been stronger.147 
The ways which innovation contributes to economic growth and the distribution 
of profit has changed significantly with globalization. The diffusion of the global 
production chain and the increasing levels of interdependency blur the traditional 
divisions of the value-added chain.148 These changes have led to distorted perceptions of 
comparative advantage in innovation when using traditional metrics such as export 
numbers of so-called high-technology products. These distorted perceptions in turn can 
lead to inflamed rhetoric and potential conflict.  
China has experienced continued growth in innovation since the start of its push 
for “Indigenous Innovation” but this has not happened in the way that its leaders may 
have envisioned. The concepts of innovation for China laid out in the bifurcated approach 
of top-down and bottom-up approaches have laid the groundwork for continued 
innovation for future years but much of the innovation over the last seven years has come 
from efforts prior to “Indigenous Innovation.” It will take significant reforms to Chinese 
society to loosen the censorship, and break-out of the conformist culture that holds China 
back from becoming an innovation superpower.149 
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Figure 15.  Pre and Post “Indigenous Innovation” Nominal GDP  
in Billions of Dollars 
Source: IMF Data Mapper; World Economic Outlook (2012).150 
 
Despite the best-laid plans and considerable spending, China’s “Indigenous 
Innovation” plan has yet to produce significant novel products or ideas. Innovation is 
taking place in China but this does not equate to invention. China has not developed an 
equivalent idea or process to match or surpass the iPod or Silicon Valley. Instead, 
innovation in China has been along the lines of second-generation innovation or 
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improvements upon existing ideas and processes. This innovation has led to some growth 
and will continue to boost the already massive manufacturing industry in China. 
Innovation continues to remain essential to economic growth; however it must be 
evaluated within the context of the globalized market economy and approached through 
cooperative strategies.151  
China, despite its efforts, will not be the leading nation for science and technology 
innovation in the next 20 years. China will continue to see significant growth fueled 
through innovation efforts aimed at improving on existing technologies and ideas. This 
growth will continue to present a challenge to the existing globally dominating economy 
of the United States. 
Although The MLP containing China’s “Indigenous Innovation” plan still has 
eight more years until its end in 2020, therefore this thesis, is a mid-point assessment. A 
complete assessment of the effectiveness of “Indigenous Innovation” will have to be done 
after 2020 and again after 2050 to assess the benchmarks set forth for these years. As 
shown by the evidence presented “Indigenous Innovation” is not on track to become 
China’s new economic engine by 2020 and in many respects Indigenous Innovation has 
been Irrelevant for Chinese Growth over the last seven years. 
The actions taken under the umbrella of “Indigenous Innovation” will eventually 
bring China forward as a high tech leader but it is unlikely that it will perform on par with 
the United States any time in the next 20 years. Many other factors in economic 
competition raise fears of China soon dominating world economics but most of these are 




                                                 
151 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “Assessing China’s Efforts to Become an 
“Innovation Society” – A Progress Report,” Hearing Before The U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, Second Session sess., (MAY 10, 2012), 34–35. 
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China’s Indigenous Innovation policy, despite its shortcomings, has indeed 
contributed to economic growth and will continue to contribute to significant economic 
growth in the future. If China adjusts its policy to focus on the university-private 
enterprise R&D nexus it will achieve the level of innovation it seeks at a more rapid rate 













A. STAGES OF NIS REFORM 
 
Source: OECD, 2008.152
                                                 
152 Liu Li, “The Evolution of China’s Science and Technology Policy, 1975–2007,” in OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy: China, 2008. 
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B. DESCRIPTION OF 16 MEGAPROJECTS  
(Source: McGregor, China’s Drive for ‘Indigenous Innovation).153 
 
1. Core electronic components, high-end general use chips and basic software 
products 
 This project focuses on the development of microwave and millimeter-
wave devices, high-end general chips, and basic software products, 
including operating systems, database management systems and 
middleware. 
 It also emphasizes securing more patents and increasing indigenous 
innovation for computers and computer systems and basic software 
products with networking and national security applications. 
 
2. Large-scale integrated circuit manufacturing equipment and techniques 
 
 China will focus on achieving the mass application of 90nm 
manufacturing equipment and attempt to localize a number of key 
technologies and components. It also plans to develop a wide array of 
equipment for manufacturing 65nm circuits, while making breakthroughs 
in R&D of key technologies for 45nm and below. 
 A key aim is to develop many core technologies for the manufacture of 
very large scale integrated (VLSI) circuits, and building an innovation 
system for China’s integrated circuit (IC) manufacturing industry. 
 
3. New generation broadband wireless mobile communication networks 
 
 China hopes to develop a new generation of broadband wireless mobile 
communication networks with large-scale communication capacities, as 
well as low cost and wide coverage broadband wireless communication 
access systems. Short-distance wireless communication systems and 
sensor networks also fall under the scope of this project. 
 China seeks to increase the number of Chinese patents in international 
technology standards and widen the application for these technologies 
while achieving an industry output of more than RMB 100 billion. 
  
                                                 
153 James McGregor, “China’s Drive for ‘Indigenous Innovation:’ A Web of Industrial Policies,” U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, (2010), 16. http://www.uschamber.com/reports/chinas-drive-indigenous-
innovation-web-industrial-policies. 
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4. Advanced numeric-controlled machinery and basic manufacturing technology 
 
 This project calls for the study of two-to-three types of large high-
precision computerized numerically controlled machine tools, and the 
development of key high-precision CNC (computer numerically 
controlled) machine tools and other basic equipment required by the 
aerospace, space shipbuilding, automotive and energy production 
equipment sectors. 
 China also seeks to make advancements in the R&D of CNC machine 
tools, and build research centers and training facilities to promote the 
development of medium and high-grade CNC machine tools. 
 
5. Large-scale oil and gas exploration 
 
 This project emphasizes the study of high-precision seismic exploration 
and exploitation technologies for oil, gas and coal-bed gas in western 
China. 
 Also of critical importance are technologies suited for exploration and 
exploitation of deep sea oil and gas resources, as well as resources with 
access complicated by difficult geological conditions. 
 China hopes to improve design and manufacturing capabilities for a 
broad range of related technology with the aim of raising oil and natural 
gas discovery rates by 10 to 20 percent, respectively, and achieving an 
oil recovery ratio of 40 to 50 percent. 
 
6. Large advanced nuclear reactors 
 
 With this project China’s goal is to combine imported technology and 
indigenous innovation to achieve advancements in a third generation of 
pressurized-water nuclear reactor power plants. 
 China also wants to complete standard designs and develop key 
technologies to build the first series of pilot high-temperature gas-cooled 
nuclear reactor power plants. This includes 200 MW high-temperature 
gas-cooled nuclear reactor power plant construction pilot projects. 
 
7. Water pollution control and treatment 
 
 China will select various types of river basins for zoning based on the 
ecological function of the water source, and study key technologies to 
control and prevent water pollution, and treat lake contaminants for the 
remediation of water resources. 
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 China also aims to makes advancements in technologies to protect, 
process and distribute drinking water, and create a system to monitor 
water pollution and water quality improvement. 
 
8. Breeding new varieties of genetically modified organisms 
 
 The main goals of this special project are to obtain indigenous 
intellectual property rights for a series of valuable new genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs), and to breed new classifications of disease 
resistant, high-yield, high-quality GMOs to improve research and 
scientific capabilities in support of agricultural industrialization and 
sustainable development. 
 The implementation of the gene modification special project has 
significant strategic importance for increasing indigenous innovation in 
China’s agricultural science and technology capabilities, improving 
agricultural efficiency and crop yield, and in increasing China’s global 
agricultural competitiveness. 
 
9. Pharmaceutical innovation and development 
 
 China is placing a significant emphasis on domestic drug innovation. 
The goals of the project include advancing technologies for the 
identification, verification and manufacture of 30 to 40 new chemical 
and bio pharmaceuticals. 
 China seeks to increase capabilities to test the efficacy and safety of new 
drugs. 
 China also aims to develop new Traditional Chinese medicines with 
verified quality and reliability. 
 
10. Control and treatment of AIDS, hepatitis, and other major diseases 
 
 The aim of this project is to achieve breakthroughs in the R&D of key 
technologies for new vaccines and pharmaceuticals. In doing so, China 
hopes to independently develop 40 types of unique diagnostic reagents, 
and 15 vaccines. 
 China also will attempt to design standards for Chinese and Western 
medicine- based prevention and cure plans. 
 
11. Large aircraft 
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 China will institute feasibility studies for developing the key 
technologies required for the domestic production of large aircraft. 
 Key focuses will include the design, R&D and manufacture of power 
systems and testing systems for large aircraft. 
 
12. High-definition earth observation system 
 
 China hopes to develop an all-weather and full-time earth observation 
system with advanced high-definition observation systems at satellite, 
aircraft and stratospheric levels. 
 An additional focus of this project is to establish an Earth observation 
data center and to improve the quality of space-related data produced in 
China. 
 
13. Manned spaceflight and lunar probe programs 
 
 China seeks to make advancements in key technologies required for 
extra- vehicular activities for astronauts, and for the Rendezvous and 
Docking (RVD) for spacecraft. 
 A central focus of this project will be to establish a man-operated, 
orbiting space laboratory. 
 Laying the foundation for a lunar probe program is also a focus of this 
project. The plan includes developing satellites for moon exploration, 
the creation of an orbital- moon exploration program, as well as general 
advancements in technologies for lunar exploration. 
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